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Abstract
A necessary function of the Internet of Things (IoT) is to sense the real-world from the
fabric of everyday environments. Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are widely deployed
as part of IoT for environmental sensing, industrial monitoring, health care, and military
purposes. Traditional WSNs are limited in terms of their management and usage model.
As an alternative paradigm for WSN management, the sensor-cloud virtualizes physical
sensors. While this model has many benefits, there are privacy issues that are not yet
addressed. The query-anonymity arises when the client wants the destination physical
sensor-node to be indistinguishable from other potential destinations. In particular, we
consider the k-anonymous query scheme in which the query destination is indistinguishable
from other k−1 probable destinations, where k is the offered level-of-anonymity. Moreover,
we are interested in a communication-based approach in which the client is required to
send k queries to at least k destinations including the node of interest in order to achieve a
level-of-anonymity k. Thus, the communication-cost increases with the level-of-anonymity
k. Consequently, there is a natural trade-off between the offered query-anonymity and
the incurred communication-cost. The analysis of such trade-off is the main problem we
address in this work.
We firstly aim at a novel theoretical framework that quantifies the security of a gen-
eral k-anonymous query scheme. Towards that, we adopt two approaches based on well-
known security models namely, ciphertext indistinguishability under chosen plaintext at-
tack (IND-CPA), and information theoretic notion of perfect secrecy. Next, we provide a
construction of a secure k-anonymous query scheme, and introduce its detailed design and
implementation, including the partition algorithm, anonymity-sets construction methods,
query routing algorithm, and querying protocol. Then we establish a set of average-case
and worst-case bounds on the cost-anonymity trade-off. We are committed to answer two
important questions: what is the communication-cost, on average and in the worst-case,
that is necessary? and what is the communication-cost that is sufficient to achieve the
required secure query k-anonymity?
Finally, we conduct extensive simulations to analyze various performance-anonymity
trade-offs to study the average and worst-case bounds on them, and investigate several
variations of anonymity-sets constructions methods. Confirming our theoretical analysis,
our evaluation results show that the bounds of the average and worst-case cost change
from quadratic asymptotic dependence on the network diameter to the same dependence
on the level-of-anonymity when the later surpasses the former. Furthermore, most of the
obtained bounds on various performance anonymity trade-offs can be expressed precisely
in terms of the offered level-of-anonymity and network diameter.
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The Internet of Things (IoT) introduces a paradigm shift in networking that aims to con-
nect real-world things to the Internet. These are things that collect information with poten-
tial value for information consumers. These IoT candidates are embedded with computing
capabilities, communication protocols, and sensors to blend into everyday environments
and seamlessly bridge the gap between people, places, and things over the Internet [1].
Inferring real-world events with sensing devices is an integral part of the Internet of
Things (IoT), where virtualization of the real-world things via cloud services is a norm due
to their huge volumes and heterogeneity. Cloud services are widely used to virtualize the
management and actuation of the real-world on the Internet of Things (IoT). Though vir-
tualization simplifies the control and management of IoT, it raises serious privacy concerns
when a client issues queries to a virtual entity that is nonetheless handled by an untrusted
cloud service provider. Consequently, query-anonymity has become a critical issue to all
the stakeholders which are related to assessment of the dependability and security of the
IoT system.
1
1.1 Sensor-Cloud-Based IoT Systems
Although many real-world things have valuable information to share, it is a challenge in
equipping them with all the required capabilities to connect to the Internet. The wide
adoption and enhancement of technologies like RFID, cloud computing, and Wireless Sen-
sor Network (WSN) have enabled the virtualization of the real-world things [1, 2]. For
instance, things with embedded sensors provide sensory data that are accessed as Web
services in the cloud and create the possibility of composing different services to infer
important knowledge about physical environments [2]. The sensed knowledge is used to
enhance the capability of the things that do not have sensing capability but are in the
same location as those things that have sensing capabilities.
Things in the physical world increasingly become fully qualified members of the Inter-
net. These IoT candidates publish themselves and query each other for information and
the interactions are available for the whole world to see. Today, most IoT candidates are
either pure sensing devices or with sensing devices embedded within [1]. Wireless Sensor
Networks (WSNs) are widely deployed as part of IoT for environmental sensing, industrial
monitoring, health care, and military purposes. Traditional WSNs are limited in terms of
their management and usage model [3]. As an alternative paradigm for WSN management,
the sensor-cloud virtualizes physical sensors. The sensor-cloud provides sensory data to
a plethora of potential smart applications via the provision of sensing-as-a-service [2, 4].
The control and management of thousands of these things via cloud services have been a
norm, and the virtualization has further enhanced their capabilities and semantics [5, 6].
2
1.2 Cost-Anonymity Trade-Off Problem
While IoT ubiquitously provides flexible, scalable, and real-time communications with the
physical world, there are increasing security and privacy concerns due to such ubiquity.
The exposure of real-world environments in the virtual world requires the IoT candidates
to have the option of being anonymous. A common situation is when a client queries a
physical sensor, the corresponding virtual sensor is queried first, and the query is passed
to the cloud as shown in Fig. 1.1, where the owners of the physical WSN and the cloud
are decoupled from the client (by the virtual sensor). This significantly impairs the trust












Figure 1.1: The scenario we consider in which a client wants the destination physical sensor
to be anonymous in the eye of a passive eavesdropper.
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The above problem can be mitigated by launching a k-anonymous query scheme [52,
53, 7, 8, 9], which attempts to make the query destination indistinguishable from other
k − 1 probable destinations, where k is the offered level-of-anonymity. An illustration
of k-anonymity is shown in Fig. 1.2. Although extensively investigated in the past, the
quantification of security of a general k-anonymous query scheme in large-scale WSN is
missing; and the trade-off between the gained security/privacy and incurred communication
overhead is not well investigated.
Motivated by the above observations, this work firstly aims at a novel theoretical frame-
work that quantifies the security of a general k-anonymous query scheme. We consider
on-demand queries where a client decides when to query the WSN to acquire sensor read-
ings, instead of event-driven or time-driven queries [8]. Secondly, since a k-anonymous
query sends additional k − 1 queries in order to achieve a level-of-anonymity of k, the in-
curred communication-cost increases with the level-of-anonymity. This trade-off has been
recognized in the literature as essential between the offered query-anonymity and the in-
curred communication-cost [8]. In this work, we go one step further by establishing a set of
average-case and worst-case bounds on such trade-off. We are committed to answer two im-
portant questions: what is the communication-cost, on average and in the worst-case, that
is necessary, and what is the communication-cost that is sufficient to achieve the required
query-anonymity? Targeting large scale network of things (IoT) that form WSNs, our cost
analysis is asymptotic, i.e. it scrutinizes the lower and upper bounds on the average and
worst-case communication-cost to achieve a specific level of secure query-anonymity.
The system models employed in the formulation of our problem, including the trust
model, the WSN network model, and the threat model are presented in the following
sections.
4
Figure 1.2: An example of k-anonymous query scheme. The client queries three nodes
including its true destination (shaded) in order to achieve a level-of-anonymity k = 3.
1.2.1 Trust Model and Application Scenario
We consider a Large WSN conglomerate owned by multiple operators, and the WSN could
be in any type like terrestrial, underground, and underwater networks for gathering envi-
ronmental data. The clients query the physical sensors for the sensed data by accessing
services provided by the sensor-cloud providers which could be governments, corporates,
or academia. The various stakeholder entities in the scenario include the operators who
own the WSNs, the cloud service providers, and the clients that query the sensors. Their
relation is that the cloud service providers lease resources from the WSN operator/owner
to offer the sensing-as-a-service to their clients [2]. Thus, it is the cloud service providers
who face their clients but are with limited knowledge on the sensor-cloud operations. Many
applications of this model are foreseen in areas like smart cities, smart transportation, and
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smart manufacturing. The clients use the sensor data for different purposes like traffic
management, resource exploration, environmental protection, air pollution control, and
civil infrastructure monitoring, etc.
With the above mentioned scenario, we consider the trust-none model where a client
trusts no other entity. However, the clients are concerned about the privacy of their interest,
queries, and data access patterns which may be compromised because of untrusted sensor-
cloud owners or other competing clients. One of the appealing characteristics of trust-none
model is that all the secrecy transformations are performed by one party namely, the owner
of the sensitive information (the client). The reason for that is the owner of sensitive
information shares none of her sensitive information with other components of the system;
therefore she is the only one who can operates on these information. The trust-none model
is so powerful that it allows the owner of the sensitive information to achieve her purpose
without revealing any sensitive information to other components of the system.
The k-anonymous query scheme furnishes an interesting application of trust-none model
in which the client (owner of sensitive information) need not to trust any other party of the
system. In our settings, the sensitive information is the ID number of the distention node
that is being queried. Consequently, cryptographic mechanisms which is based on secret
key sharing is of no benefit here since there is no trusted entity in the system which the
client can share secret with. On the other hand, to allow the destination nodes to respond
faithfully to the k-anonymous query, they have to be able to understand it. Hence messages
(queries and their responses) must be sent anonymously in plain text which makes the case
for communication-based anonymity schemes.
An interesting application scenario is the deep-sea oil exploration, where an oil company
(client) is interested in querying the deep sea WSN that is owned by operators who are
different from the cloud service provider [8]. Certainly the oil company (client) is not
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willing to share its interest with other stakeholder entities. It follows that a trust-none
model is such that the client treats the WSN, the cloud service provider, and other clients
as untrustworthy adversaries.
1.2.2 Network Model
Since query-anonymity solutions in a large-scale WSN are considered, we group the WSN
sensor nodes into clusters whose head are elected or pre-assigned by network designer [10].
On the contrary to the flat topology, the clustering-based hierarchical topology performs
well in large-scale WSN [10]. This is mainly because of the reduced energy, computa-
tion, and communication requirements of sensor nodes in each cluster. The clustering
protocols in WSN are energy-efficient in order to prolong the battery life of sensor nodes
and the whole WSN lifetime. In addition, they enhance the network coverage, operation
and management. For example, the cluster-heads schedules activities, such as transmis-
sion and reception time, in their clusters so that cluster members switches to low-power
sleep mode more often. Clustering helps to localize the intra-cluster routing messages ex-
changes within each cluster, and limits the inter-cluster communications to cluster-heads
lowering transmission retries and redundant exchanges. Furthermore, cluster-heads can
aggregate data collected from sensor nodes in their clusters to further conserve the com-
munication bandwidth and energy consumption. Data aggregation involves combing data
from different sensor nodes in the cluster using functions such as min, max, average, and
suppression of redundant data. Data aggregation cuts down on energy since computa-
tion is an energy-saver as compared to radio data transmission. All of the proceeding
advantages of clustering result in reducing the rate of energy consumption for each sensor
node in WSN, and make clustering the topology of choice when scalability is the main
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network design objective [10, 11]. Examples of clustering routing and election protocols
designed for WSN are: Low-Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy (LEACH) [12], and
Hybrid Energy-Efficient Distributed clustering (HEED) [13].
As in prior work on WSN query anonymity [8, 14], our graph model abstracts the intra-
cluster routing among sensor nodes inside each cluster since these details are not relevant
to our work. However, the cluster-heads form a second tier network upon which we build
a routing tree to facilitate inter-cluster communication. As we will show in Chapter 5, the
inter-cluster routing affects the semantics of the incurred communication-cost to achieve a
specific query-anonymity level.
Accordingly, the WSN is modeled as undirected connected graph G(V,E), where V
(vertices) are a number of n cluster heads joined by links or edges E. For every two
nodes vi, vj ∈ V , it holds that the edge (vi, vj) ∈ E if and only if whatever vi transmits,
vj can always receive, i.e., vi is adjacent to vj. It is important not to confuse WSN
sensor nodes with the nodes in the graph, where the nodes in the graph are cluster-heads
that are richer in resources compared to their cluster members and serve as gateway for
relaying/broadcasting the clients’ queries. We consider all cluster heads to be equal in
power, computation, and communication capabilities.
1.2.3 Attacker Model
The adversary in our setting is an unconditional global passive eavesdropper who is able
to monitor and analyze all the message exchange between the client and the WSN but
does not actively alter them. This is an often adopted adversarial model called the semi-
honest or honest-but-curious adversary [15]. The adversary is global and strong enough to
have access to the entire WSN. When there is no limitation on the computational power
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of the adversary or on her ability to collude with other component of the system, it is
unconditional.
We follow Kerchhoffs’s principle or Shannon maxim of security by transparency [16]:
the adversary knows the whole anonymity scheme including the details of the anonymity
transformations. However the adversary is able to conduct cipher-text only traffic analysis
attack. That is the attacker has access only to the output of anonymity transformation
(the anonymity-set) when it is executed.
1.3 Thesis Motivations and Contributions
The first aim of this work is to review and categorize the major trends in the field of
anonymous communication (see Chapter 2). Our contributions in this area are two folds:
1. We propose a cost-based classification paradigm that groups the most influential
anonymous communication schemes into two broad classes: crypto-based and com-
munication based systems. Our classification of the anonymous communication sys-
tems into crypto-based and communication-based shed light on the fact that lit-
tle of research work has been done on the communication-based system than the
crypto-based systems. Furthermore, we show that the trade-off between latency and
anonymity is the main issue in the first category, whereas the main problem in the
second is the trade-off between incurred communication-cost and offered anonymity.
2. We also discuss how anonymity metrics and notions have been developed to evaluate
the offered security properties of anonymous communication schemes.
The second aim of this work is to propose a theoretical framework that quantifies
the security of a general k-anonymous query scheme (see Chapter 3) [14, 17, 18]. The
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trade-off between communication-cost and anonymity in communication-based anonymous
schemes is an area that requires more attention. Since the cost (computational, delay or
communication overhead) are usually measurable, measuring anonymity and having the
right metrics and notions are the more challenging area of research. Indeed the absence of
such a theoretical framework that captures the practical concerns of k-anonymous query
scheme motivated this work. The secure query k-anonymity notion proposed in this work
is proved to be helpful in the design, analysis of trade-off between query-anonymity and
communication-cost, and evaluation of provably secure query-anonymity schemes. We
summarize our contributions in this area as follow:
1. We propose an unconditional notions of secure query k-anonymity on the basis of
two well-known security models namely, ciphertext indistinguishability under chosen
plaintext attack (IND-CPA), and information theoretic notion of perfect secrecy. Our
notions formally define what it means to be secure for k-anonymous query schemes.
They also scrutinize the practical design aspects of secure k-anonymous query scheme.
2. We unify the indistinguishability and perfect secrecy characterization of anonymity
with the standard and intuitive concept of anonymity-set in a natural way.
3. We show that constructing equi-probable anonymity-sets is not only sufficient for
achieving a certain level-of-anonymity, but also the cheapest manner in which to
achieve it.
The third aim of our work is to analyze the trade-off between incurred communication-
cost and offered secure query k-anonymity (see Chapters 4, 5, and 6) [17, 18, 19]. Although
this trade-off has been recognized in the literature as essential [8], it is not well-investigated.
Specifically, our contributions in this area are summarized in the following:
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1. We provide a construction of a secure k-anonymous query scheme that is the Dis-
joint Anonymity-sets (DAS) scheme. DAS satisfies our definition of secure query
k-anonymity, and it is agnostic to application and topology.
2. We propose a specification paradigm for the design and implementation of DAS for
privacy preservation in the presence of unconditional eavesdropping adversary in-
cluding its partition algorithm, anonymity-sets construction methods, query routing
algorithm, and querying protocol.
3. We establish a set of average and worst-case asymptotic bounds on cost-anonymity
trade-offs. We show that the network diameter plays the role of a system-wide
inflection point (k = Θ(d)) at which the asymptotic growth of the average and
worst-case communication-cost changes from d2 into k2 dominance. Additionally,
the return-on-investment ROI is at its highest values at this point.
4. We introduce performance metrics to measure the offered location-anonymity namely,
the radius of cloaking area r, and the maximum cloaking distances dmax.
5. We show that most of the bounds on various performance-anonymity trade-offs are
functions of the level-of-anonymity k, and network diameter d.
1.4 Organization of The Thesis
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents a literature survey on
the anonymous communication systems comparing the two prominent approaches namely,
the crypto-based, and the communication-based that is our field of study. We also reviews
different approached to define and measure anonymity. In Chapter 3, we introduce two
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novel theoretical frameworks to formally define the secrecy of a general k-anonymous query
anonymity scheme based on ciphertext indistinguishability, and information theoretic no-
tion of perfect secrecy models. Chapter 4 firstly presents an application and topology
agnostic construction that satisfies our notion of secure query k-anonymity presented in
Chapter 3, then we provide the design and implementation details of it. In chapter 5, we
analyze the trade-off between the communication-cost and query-anonymity in a sensor-
cloud-based IoT setting that utilizes square grid WSN. Our cost analysis shows that the
behavior of the secure k-anonymous query scheme is shaped by two variables, namely the
level-of-anonymity k, and the network diameter d. Simulation results are given in chapter
6 that confirm our theoretical assertions. We finally conclude the thesis in Chapter 7, and





Schemes, and Their Anonymity
Notions - a Survey
In this survey, we review the most influential schemes of anonymous communication, and
compare them to our own. We are focusing on the design concepts and major weaknesses
that lead to attacking these systems by passive and active attackers.
Considering anonymous communication schemes which deal with sending and receiving
of messages anonymously, anonymity is usually used to hide the identities of the actual
sender, receiver or both within anonymity-set of other possible senders and/or receivers.
They are called sender anonymity, receiver anonymity, and relationship anonymity respec-
tively.
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The first anonymous communication scheme is the Mix-Net proposed by David Chaum
in 1981 [20]. The Mix-Net hides the relationship between senders’ identities on their input,
and receivers’ identities on their output. Chaum also introduced the notion of anonymity-
set in the DC-Net in 1988 [21]. The set of all possible subjects that the anonymous subject
belongs to. For example, for the case of sender/receiver anonymity, it is the set of all
possible senders/receivers of the anonymous message.
Since the introduction of Mix-Net and DC-Net, different anonymous communication
schemes and protocols have been proposed to provide sender, receiver, or relationship
anonymity. However, based on the cost-based classification we propose in this chapter,
they fall mostly into two broad classes of anonymous communication schemes namely,
crypto-based which follows Mix-Net approach, and communication-based which is built on
DC-Net idea. Anonymous communication has become an extremely active area of research
with wide range of applications. Additionally, a variety of countermeasures have been
investigated to protect against possible attacks that compromise the anonymity solutions.
As we mentioned in section 1.3, the contributions of this chapter are as follows. We pro-
posed a classification paradigm for the most influential anonymous communication schemes
based on the main component of the cost incurred by the anonymity solution. Thus we
classify them into crpto-based schemes when the cost is mainly the computational-cost of
the cryptographic technique used, and into communication-based schemes when the com-
munication overhead cost constitutes the dominant part of the anonymity solution cost.
Our own scheme falls under the communication-based class. The chapter also presents an
overview of the anonymity notions and metrics that are used to evaluate these schemes.
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2.1 Crypto-Based Anonymous Communication Schemes
In this section, we describe the most prominent cypto-based anonymous communication
schemes. As we will show, the main issue in this class of anonymous communication scheme
is the trade-off between latency and offered anonymity.
2.1.1 Mix-Net Scheme
The Mix-Net consists of intermediate nodes acting as proxy servers that utilize public
key cryptography to hide the relationship between senders’ identities on their input and
receivers’ identities on their output. The sender encrypts its message using the public key
of the receiver, and then encrypts the result with the public key of the proxy server that
forwards the inner encrypted message to the receiver after mixing it with other messages.
The local attacker who observes the messages at the input and output of the mix server
is unable to link them, hence the Mix-Net provides unlinkability. However the single mix
network introduces a single point of failure, and single point of trust in the system. A
feature that is undesirable in most of the high availability systems. To ensure reliability,
multiple mix servers are cascaded to route the messages between the sender and receiver.
The sender creates multiple layers of encryption starting with encrypting her message using
the public key of the receiver. Then she encrypts the resulting ciphertext using the public
key of the last mix server, which is the closest to the receiver, and continues backward
to the first mix server along the message path. On top of its legacy as a keystone, the
high-latency cascade of these proxy servers is essentially the principle of onion routing [22],
which is implemented in the low-latency Tor scheme [23].
Two main approaches are proposed in the literature to choose the message path namely:
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free routes which allows the sender to define her own message path, as the one used in our
source routing algorithm, and mix cascades in which the message path is chosen from a
predefined set of routes [24]. The free route provides better failure tolerance in the event
of message path failure since it gives the user more freedom in choosing the best route [25].
The flushing algorithm or batching strategy [26, 27] is used to decide how, and when
to forward the messages out of a mix server. It is a fruitful area of research that is
resulted in several designs that falls into two broad categories namely, deterministic and
probabilistic. Examples of the deterministic algorithms are: the Threshold, Timed, and
Threshold-and-Timed mixes, and examples of the probabilistic algorithms are: Stop-and-
Go, and Binomial mixes. The Threshold strategy defines a threshold n on the number of
mixed messages after which the mix server starts forwarding message to the next server or
to the receiver [20]. In the Timed mix, the messages are outputted out of the mix after a
specified time limit t [26], while the Threshold-and-Timed mix combine both of the above
strategies together [26]. The Stop-and-Go Mix forwards the message after an exponentially
distributed time delay [28]. The Binomial Mix selects the forwarded messages according
to binomial distribution [27].
Several attacks against Mix-Net have been devised in the literature. The flooding
attack or (n − 1) attack is an active attack against Threshold mix. In this attack, the
adversary delays one message from entering the mix, and floods it with bogus messages till
it flushes. Then the adversary allows the delayed message to enter the mix within a flood
of dummy messages to recognize it after encryption [26]. The trickle active attack uses
similar concept of flood attack but it targets Timed mixes and uses no dummy messages
[26]. The flooding and trickle use similar attack strategy which is ”blending” attacks [29].
While the blending attacks succeeded against deterministic flushing algorithms, it is more
difficult to compromise the probabilistic flushing algorithms. Since original mix design
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is based on public cryptography using RSA algorithm [30], researchers described active
attacks that make use of the fact that RSA is not a randomized encryption. Consequently,
similar plaintexts at the input of the mix will result in similar ciphertexts at the output.
In addition, a plaintext with known ciphertext will not be anonymous at the output of the
mix [31]. As a countermeasure, the input and output messages are made to be equal size
using random padding, and ElGamal public key cryptosystem is used instead of RSA since
it provides semantic security [32].
The anonymity scheme studied in this thesis is different from Mix-Net in several angles.
Unlike our trust-none model, which uses no third party component, Mix-net is a proxy-
based system in which a mix server acts as a performance bottleneck, and a single point
of failure when an adversary is in control of the proxy, as we show in the proceeding
paragraph. Mix-net is vulnerable to the collaborations among mix serves on the contrary
of our scheme whose offered anonymity is not affected by the corruption of the system
components other than the client herself. Mix-Net relies on public key cryptography [33]
to perform its main function which cannot be readily applied to the WSN scarce resources
environment. Mix-Net has an advantage in terms of local adversary who can see only the
previous and next mix server, while our scheme offers almost similar level-of-anonymity
against both of the local and global adversary. Compared to Mix-Net, our scheme incurs
much less network latency and computational-cost, but higher communication-cost.
2.1.2 Tor Scheme
Tor is the second generation of onion routing [23]. Onion routing uses cascades of mix
servers to provide anonymity for TCP-based communication [22]. The onion consists of
layers of encryption that covers the source’s address and the message. Every Onion router
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(OR), on the path between client and destination, peels off a layer, and appends a random
padding to maintain a constant size onion before forwarding to the next OR. The constant
size onion prevents leaking information about the position of the OR on the client path to
destination due to onion size change.
Tor is optimized for anonymous Web browsing and real time applications to be a low
latency anonymous communication scheme. This does not come for free since it relies on
forwarding the message in real time without doing a proper mixing.
Tor is a circuit-based communication scheme that utilizes hybrid encryption, symmetric
and public key cryptography. Tor circuit establishment starts when the client download
a list of onion routers (ORs) from a directory server, typically three ORs. Then the
client creates tunneled secure channels with the three ORs using the Transport Secure
Layer protocol (TLS) [34]. Afterward the client negotiate three secret keys with the ORs
using authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol. At this point the client can
communicate anonymously over the Internet in real time because each OR knows only its
direct adjacent ORs in Tor circuit.
Tor defends against attack that tried to insert malicious ORs in the client path by
using dedicated directory servers. This approach is similar to ours that uses source routing
instead. However an adversary can compromise the security of Tor by controlling or just
watching the first and the last ORs. This is true because Tor, which is designed for Web
users, trade anonymity for Web usability and cheap of operation for Internet users [23].
That is unlike Mix-Net, Tor maintains low latency anonymous communication by passing
messages in real time and not providing a heavy traffic cover in the mixing process. This
vulnerability opens the door to traffic analysis family of attacks in which the adversary
intercepts multiple outputs of anonymity scheme in order to exploit redundant patterns
in long-lived transactions using statistical methods, and subvert the provided anonymity.
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Examples of these attacks are: intersection, predecessor or statistical disclosure, and traffic
correlation. In intersection attack [35, 36, 37, 38], the adversary intersects multiple out-
puts of the anonymity scheme in order to identify the anonymous subject. In predecessor
or statistical disclosure attack, the adversary counts how often a specific destination has
been accessed by the suspected anonymous source for sender anonymity, and vice versa for
receiver anonymity, over multiple runs of the anonymity scheme [39, 40]. Such traffic anal-
ysis attacks exploit the fact that the scheme leaks information to the adversary who is able
to provide not-equally likely probability values to the possible subjects (senders/receivers),
and reveal the victim’s identity. Statistical attack can also be viewed as an intersection of
multiple outputs of anonymity scheme to compromise the anonymity of the most frequent
common subject among them. Thus, they are used interchangeably in the literature, and
in this work. The defence against intersection and statistical attack is an open problem
that is difficult to solve efficiently [41, 42]. Specific to Tor, the adversary mounts inter-
section attack to reveal victim’s identity by monitoring how the sets of active Web users,
which provides a cover to the victim’s traffic, decreases in size by intersecting them over
multiple runs of the scheme. Whereas in statistical attack, she simply counts how often
a Web resource has been accessed by the same Tor user, and identifies the most frequent
user as the initiator. During traffic correlation attack [43], the adversary correlates timing
and other traffic flow characteristics to undermine the anonymity scheme.
An instance of these attacks is demonstrated for the case of using Tor as a mechanism
for location-hidden services via rendezvous points in [44]. Countermeasures to combat this
attack is based on requiring the hidden server to always connect through “entry gaurds”
[44], or the client to first connect to a trusted “valet services node” [45]. Therefore The
selection of the first and last ORs is very crucial for the security of Tor.
In contrast to Tor, our scheme requires no trusted nodes, provably secure against global
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eavesdropping adversary, and incurs much less network latency and computational-cost,
but higher communication-cost. Our scheme precludes all types of traffic analysis at-
tacks including intersection and statistical disclosure attacks by having disjoint outputs
(anonymity-sets) of the anonymity scheme so that all subjects (members of anonymity-
sets) are equiprobable.
2.1.3 Remailer Schemes
Remailer schemes aim at providing sender and receiver anonymity for email users. Be-
ing Mix-Net-based, they are high latency store, mix then forward systems which suits
non-interactive email application. Three Remailer generations have been developed by
researchers along the years, namely: Type I, Type II, and Type III remailers.
Type I is the Cypherpunk [33] which consists of cascade of systems that strip the
identities of emails before forwarding them to their final destination. The Pretty Good
Privacy (PGP) public key cryptography protocol is used for encryption to defend against
eavesdropper. The users’ actual identities are not kept in a database which is an important
improvement compared to its ancestor anon.penet.fi remailer.
Since PGP does not hide the message size, the message size leaks information to the
adversary about the position of the remailer. The reusable reply blocks, which is used for
anonymous email reply, is another weak point that an active attacker can use to trace the
recipient path. Type II remailer which is the Mixmaster system [46] fixed the problem of
the variable message size of Type I, but it kept the reusable reply block vulnerability.
Type III is the Mixminion system [47]. It provides sender and receiver anonymity.
Mixminion uses TLS [34] which provides end-to-end perfect forward secure channel between
sender and receiver. The user email passes through a cascades of mixes which involves
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permutations and delay before it reaches its recipient. Every mix server can see only its
direct adjacent servers as it is customary in Mix-Net-based schemes.
Mixminion uses only a single-use reply blocks (SURBs) as a control against tracing the
recipient path vulnerability of previous remailer types. To prevent tagging attack it utilizes
a cryptographic checksum. In tagging attack, and active adversary modifies the message
in such a way to have a tag which allows the adversary to trace it along the path.
In general, Remailer are high latency Mix-Net-based systems, thus our scheme have
similar comparisons with them as that mentioned in section 2.1.1. Additionally, all the
messages in our schemes are equiprobable which precludes tagging attack.
2.2 Communication-Based Anonymous Communica-
tion Schemes
In this section, we will study anonymous communication schemes that are not based on
using cryptographic primitive. Although they may use cryptography for some parts of the
anonymity solution, it does not constitute the major part. They replace computational-cost
of using cryptographic primitive by the communication-cost resulted from using random
routing, multicast, or broadcast transmission. Our secure k-anonymous query scheme,
presented in Chapter 3, falls under this class of anonymous communication schemes. As




Chaum proposed DC-Net in 1988 [21]. The DC-Net achieves anonymity by embedding
the message into a broadcast of other users’ broadcast transmission. Although the DC-
Net name comes from the problem of dining cryptographers introduced by Chaum, the
techniques itself is essentially based on broadcast transmission of users’ messages where
the communication-cost is quadratic in the number of participating users.
The problem behind DC-Net design is that a group of cryptographers get paid for their
dinner anonymously by either the National Security Agency (NSA), or one of them. They
are curious to know if they get paid by the NSA. The DC-Net offers a scheme to solve
the problem by having each cryptographer flips a coin, and exchange the result with her
neighbor on the right hand side. Then all of them broadcast the XOR of result of the two
flips they know. That is for user i, she knows her flip result (fi) and her neighbor’s flip
result fj, then she will broadcast (fi ⊕ fj). However if any one of the cryptographers has
paid for their dinner, she must do additional XOR with 1 before broadcasting the result.
The cryptographers will know if any one of them pays for their dinner when the modulo-2
sum (XOR) of the broadcasted messages is 1, otherwise the NSA is the one who pays for
their dinner. This is true because they constitute a circular graph, and therefore their
messages will have similar terms that cancel each other except for the 1 that is added by
the cryptographer who paid for their dinner. This protocol sends a single bit anonymously,
and similar approach is used to send messages with arbitrary length.
The main issues with DC-Net is that it incurs bandwidth overhead because it utilizes
broadcast transmission. The communication-cost incurred to send a single bit anonymously
is in the order of n(n − 1), where n is the number of users. That is, the communication-
cost is quadratic in the number of participants. This is because DC-Net trades high
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communication-cost for maximum level-of-anonymity that is equal to the size of network
n. Although DC-Net does not scale well with the network size n, it is immune to traffic
analysis attacks such as intersection and statistical disclosure attacks since it uses a single
anonymity-set of size n. DC-Net provides an information-theoretic perfect secrecy solution
that is analogous to One-Time Pad in cryptography.
The main attacks against DC-Net are users collusion and message collision attacks.
Users can collude to reveal the identity of the sender. In addition, an insider attacker
can choose to send a message every run of the DC-Net protocol, or just drop the protocol
causing denial of service attack. Ways to prevent message collision attack are based on
the idea of assuring that at any one time a single user is allowed to send a message in
the broadcast transmission which prevent collisions. This is achieved by different methods
in the literature such as having a reservation protocol to reserve one slot for each user
has message to send [48], or using Xor-trees [49] which prevents two user from sending a
message in the same time.
Our secure k-anonymous scheme is similar to DC-Net since they are both provably
secure, low latency communication-based schemes that suffers from the consequences of the
trade-off between incurred communication-cost and offered level-of-anonymity. However,
our scheme is provably secure, much simpler, and scalable. It achieves most of its scalability
by allowing the level-of-anonymity k to vary from 1 to n, where n is the size of network,
instead of offering maximum anonymity (k = n) at all times, as in the case of DC-Net.
Moreover, our trust-none model provides a proactive solution against collusion attacks
since the client trusts no other entity in the scheme, hence the security of the scheme does
not rely on the honesty of other entities.
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2.2.2 Crowds Scheme
Crowds scheme is designed to provide anonymity for users browsing the Internet without
using a cryptographic primitive [50]. It basically replaces the computational-cost of cryp-
tography by the communication-cost of additional random forwarding within a crowd of
users. The user first joins a crowd which is a list of other Internet users that can be down-
loaded from a central server. When she wants to connect to a Web server, she forwards her
web request to a randomly selected member of the crowd. The recipient tosses a coin to
decide on either sending the Web request directly to the Web server, or keep forwarding it
to another member of the crowd in which case the process is repeated. The coin is biased
towards forwarding through the crowd member.
Each member of the crowd knows its adjacent members only, and there is no way to
classify the previous crowd member as an initiator of the Web request or a forwarder.
Hence Crowds scheme achieves source anonymity against local attacker who is allowed to
control part of the crowd and/or the end Web server. However since the Web request and
response are forwarded in a clear text using the same path, the anonymity is no longer
maintained after the first compromised member of the crowd [33].
The values of probabilities of forwarding to another crowd member and sending to the
server affect the trade-off between communication-cost and achieved anonymity. Larger
forwarding probability value tends to increase the the communication-cost and anonymity,
while a small value decreases the achieved anonymity and communication-cost [50].
Leaving the perfectly secure yet costly maximum anonymity environment of DC-Net,
Crowds scheme is vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks such as intersection and predecessor
attacks [39, 40]. In this statistical attack, the adversary counts the number of times a Web
resource is accessed by the same crowed member, and identify the one with the most
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request as the actual source.
Our scheme provides k-anonymity as further enhancement to the communication-based
approach in order to tackle the problem of trade-off between incurred communication-cost
and offered anonymity. On the other hand, Crowds scheme utilizes a random walk strategy
to achieve the same goal considering large scale network. In addition, our scheme adopts
disjoint anonymity-sets as a countermeasure against intersection and statistical attacks.
2.2.3 K-Anonymous Schemes
Our scheme falls under this subcategory of communication-based class of anonymous com-
munication schemes. The k-anonymous schemes come as an application of k-anonymity
[51] in the communication-based anonymous communication schemes to tackle the prob-
lem of trade-off between communication-cost and anonymity. In theses schemes, the
sendr/receiver of a message is indistingushable from others with a probability non-negligibly
greater than 1/k, where k is the offered level-of-anonymity.
To solve the problem of scalability in DC-Net scheme, Herbivore [52], CliqueNet [53],
Ahn et al. [7], Carbunar et al. [8], and De Cristofaro et al. [54] divide the network of size
n into multiple DC-Nets, called cliques, groups or regions that serve as anonymity-sets, of
size k ∈ [1, n]. These schemes are vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks by global adversary
including intersection and statistical attacks since they allow k to vary below the maximum
anonymity of k = n that is achieved by DC-Net. That is, an adversary, who intercepts
the scheme for sufficiently long time, may assign different probability values to different
members of a clique or group to reveal the victim identity.
As a step towards addressing such risks, Herbivore allows nodes to launch intersec-
tion attack on themselves as a self penetration testing step to check whether the offered
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anonymity has been compromised. Additionally, they provide another protection mea-
sure by introducing Exit phase to limit the changes to clique size during long-running
anonymous communications.
To defend against global eavesdropper, the work of Carbunar et al. [8], presents an
anonymous query scheme that utilizes several k-anonymous transformations namely: the
Union, Randomized, and Hybrid transformations, to anonymize a sequence of queries Q
in the context of WSN. Each query corresponds to a destination node in the WSN. These
transformations produce a larger sequence of destination nodes M than the sequence of
queried nodes at their input Q by adding additional nodes. That is, each query qi ∈ Q
is transformed into a set of WSN nodes. Compared to our scheme which transforms
each individual query into its corresponding anonymity-set of size k ∈ [1, n], this scheme
introduces more latencies in the system by requiring to store a sequence of queries before
execution. Moreover, since our attacker model allows the adversary to know the whole
anonymity scheme including the generated disjoint anonymity-sets ( see section 1.2.3), we
gain no security advantage from anonymizing a sequence of queries.
The work of De Cristofaro et al. [54], which can be considered as a modification or
an extension of Carbunar et al. [8], introduces a k-anonymous querying protocol for WSN
environment that collects response from all nodes along the source route in a piggyback
manner. That is each node in the source route attaches its response to the single query
packet. Being k-anonymous schemes, these schemes are vulnerable to intersection and
statistical attacks.
Carbunar et al. [8] k-anonymous scheme applies keyed-Hash Message Authentication
Code (HMAC) on the client query to make it indistinguishable from a random string.
This defends against a local eavesdropper who have access to only part of the WSN, such
as the servers that connects the client to the WSN. We argue that the HMAC provides
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a confidentiality service that fails to protect against a global eavesdropper. The global
eavesdropper have access to the whole WSN, and able to gather information about the route
of the query and response path. As countermeasures against such global attackers, they
present several anonymity transformations that query dummy destinations in addition to
the true one. De Cristofaro et al. [54] scheme uses onion routing to enhance the anonymity
obtained from collecting responses from all hops along the source route to and from the
true destination. They consider local attacker who is able to intercept intercommunication
among only infected nodes; the nodes under the control of the attacker. The maximum
anonymity is achieved when the true destination is indistinguishable from all of WSN nodes,
that is k = n. Since onion routing encrypts the intercommunication traffic among WSN
nodes, and their attacker model is local, then the maximum anonymity is achieved when the
number of infected nodes is zero. Nevertheless, the anonymity degrades to the number of
source routes hops when all the WSN nodes are infected. Notwithstanding the encryption
of traffic provided by the onion routing, if a global eavesdropper is contemplated, this
scheme can not offer the true destination better anonymity than the number of the source
route hops. It becomes obvious that the encoding of the network traffic using HMAC or
onion routing does not have any advantage on the offered anonymity level when a global
eavesdropper is adopted. As a deduction, we take a radically different approach that adopts
no encoding techniques. Instead, we allow our powerful global eavesdropper to see the
contents of the source route without sacrificing the offered anonymity. In short, we decouple
security services, such as confidentiality, Integrity, and authentication, from anonymity
service to construct a pure anonymity solution. These security services is customarily
provided using standard cryptographic techniques which is out of the scope of this work.
Both schemes [8, 54] utilize different cryptographic algorithms such as ECC, AES,
HMAC, and MD5 whereas we are using none of them for the reasons explained above.
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This results in a significant saving in the incurred computational-cost, delay and storage
requirements of the keys that makes our approach a more suitable one for a scarce resources
environments such as that of WSN [55], sensor-cloud-based IoT systems, and low latency
Web and real time applications.
Furthermore, both of Carbunar et al. [8] and De Cristofaro et al. [54] schemes maintain
constant size routing packet using techniques of padding or appending the routing hops.
While this conceals the position of the current routing hop from local eavesdropper, we
find that, when a global eavesdropper is considered, it is unnecessarily increases the exact
communication-cost by a factor of ( 2
1+δ
), where δ is the inverse of the length of the routing
path1. However, asymptotically our work and theirs incur the same.
Our trust model is also different from that of Carbunar et al. [8] and De Cristofaro et
al. [54]. Colluding of the two servers of Carbunar et al. [8] makes them as powerful as a
global eavesdropper. Similarly, colluding of WSN nodes in De Cristofaro et al. [54] results
in the same. alternatively, we propose an effective mechanism to anonymously querying
the WSN in an environment where the anonymity beneficiary (the client) trusts no party
other than herself. Thus, the attained anonymity does not depend on how honest other
system components behave.
Most of these schemes, even in their simulation results, have not analyzed the trade-
off between query-anonymity and incurred communication-cost along the whole range of
anonymity level. This is mainly because of the possibility of the intersection and statistical
attacks which varies in its severity based on the client access pattern. Since this access pat-
tern is modeled as random process, hence the level-of-anonymity is not deterministic. For
1Let x denotes the source route path length, then the communication-cost of the constant size source
route packet is equal to x + x + · · · + x = x × x = x2. Whereas, the communication-cost of the variable








example, De Cristofaro et al. [54] provide a WSN querying protocol without characterizing
the trade-off between its achievable query-anonymity and its incurred communication-cost.
They measure the cost practically and independently from the obtained level-of-anonymity.
As a step towards addressing this lack in the literature, the cost-anonymity trade-off anal-
ysis ( Chapter 5) that utilizes our secure query k-anonymity notion ( Chapter 3) is the
central focus of this work.
2.3 Anonymity Notions and Metrics
Chaums introduced the notion of anonymity-set s in the DC-Net [21] in 1988. The well-
cited definition of anonymity-set is given by [56]: “Anonymity of a subject means that the
subject is not identifiable within a set of subjects, the anonymity-set.”
Since then, different anonymous communication solutions and protocols have been pro-
posed. Additionally, a variety of countermeasures have been investigated to protect against
possible attacks that compromise the anonymity solutions. However, most of these sys-
tems assume that the attacker can do no better than a assigning equally likely a posteriori
probabilities of 1/|s| to the anonymity-set members, where |s| is the size of anonymity-set.
From the information theoretic viewpoint, this means the attacker learns no information
from intercepting the anonymous communication scheme [16]. Thus, anonymity-set size
|s| comes in handy as a measure to evaluate the quality of anonymity.
Berthold et al. [36] uses a different anonymity measure which is equal to log2|s|.Yet
the equally likely a posteriori probabilities environment is also taken for granted for this
measure to work because log2|s| measures the information needed by attacker to break the
anonymity system when the a posteriori probabilities are equally likely as it is shown by
[57, 58].
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Analogous to Berthold et al. [36], Herbivore [52], CliqueNet [53], Ahn et al. [7],
Carbunar et al. [8], and De Cristofaro et al. [54] specify no mechanism to fully control the
information leak vulnerability, and prevent traffic analysis attacks such as intersection or
statistical attacks. Thus, there were no clear measurement model for the quality of offered
anonymity. In their performance analysis, Herbivore [52] uses the clique size which is
equivalent to the anonymity-set size as a performance index without satisfying the condition
of equiprobable a posteriori probabilities. Ahn et al. [7] provide no implementation, and
thus no performance analysis for their scheme.
Realizing that intra-redundancy may occur within Q, the sequence of queries inputted
to the anonymity scheme, and/or within output sequence M , the notion of anonymity
of Carbunar et al. [8] considers only the unique WSN nodes in Q and M , which are
denoted as Q̃ and M̃ respectively. M̃ set is basically the anonymity-set. Thus they define
query-anonymity S(T ) (called “spacial privacy” there) as the inverse of the probability
of guessing the true destination given M̃ , specifically S(T ) = |M̃ |/|Q̃|. The maximum
achievable anonymity arises when the true destination is indistinguishable from the rest




n square grid WSN, when
the input query sequence length is 1 (i.e. |Q̃| = 1), the maximum anonymity S(T ) = n is
achieved when |M̃ | = n. That is when all of WSN nodes appears in the output sequence as
possible destinations. On the the contrary, when |M̃ | = 1, no anonymity is provided since
S(T ) = 1. Carbunar et al. [8] uses the temporal privacy notion to refer to the concealment
of query frequency information.
Although not mentioned, the implicit assumption for their query-anonymity definition
[8] to be useful is that the events of M members being true destinations are mutually
exclusive events with equally likely probabilities. This is exactly the same conditions under
which the concept of anonymity-set operates [59, 60, 61]. However their scheme offers no
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control on the inter-redundancy or intersection among different output sequences. This
leaks information to the adversary, and opens doors to intersection and statistical attacks
that breaks the equiprobable probabilities requirement [62, 63, 64]. In intersection attack,
as mentioned in section 2.1.2, the attacker intersects the output sequences of multiple runs
of the querying protocol to narrow his search for the true destination. Depending on its
severity, the intersection attack shrinks the level-of-anonymity to as low as zero which takes
place when the intersection results in one destination node [65]. These observations make
the above anonymity measurement model not a valid one since no level-of-anonymity can be
claimed if the scheme is vulnerable to such attack. It is worth noting that their Dynamic
Transform, which tries to uniformize the the probability distribution of M , provides a
reactive solution to this problem even though this is not mentioned explicitly.
Reiter and Rubin in their work on Crowds[50], were the first to realize the need for
the anonymity measurement model to consider the not-equally likely a posteriori proba-
bilities that is assigned by attacker to the anonymity-set members. In other words, the
equally likely a posteriori probabilities is not always guaranteed. However, their probabilis-
tic anonymity metric gauges anonymity of each member of the anonymity-set separately
instead of the whole anonymity-set. Consequently, it does not measure the quality of
anonymity for the entire anonymity sheme [33]. Later, this approach is referred to as local
anonymity measure [66], in opposite to global anonymity measure which uses a system-
wide metrics. In Stop-and-Go-Mix, Kesdogan et al.[28] acknowledges the possibility of
not-equally likely a posteriori probabilities, nevertheless it is not investigated further.
In their important step to standardize the anonymity terminology, Pfitzmann and
Kohntopp [67, 56] put forward a simple scale for anonymity measurement by stating that,
“ Anonymity is the stronger, the larger the respective anonymity-set is and the more evenly
distributed the sending or receiving, respectively, of the subjects within that set is”. Thus,
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they affirm that the probability distribution of the anonymity-set members has a signif-
icant impact on the quality of anonymity measurement in addition to the anonymity-set
size. Yet no mathematical measurement model is articulated to determine the quality of
anonymity.
Inspired by the concept of a posteriori probability distribution of anonymity-set mem-
bers that is introduced by Pfitzmann and Kohntopp [67], Serjantov and Danezis [58]
uses the Shannon entropy [68] as a system-wide metric to measure the additional av-
erage information per anonymity-set member that attacker needs to identify the actual
sender/receiver of a message. Their measurement metric is called Effective Anonymity-
Set Size (S) which is defined as, S = H(X) = −
∑|s|
i=1 P (xi)log2(P (xi)) , where X is a
discrete random variable that denotes the actual sender/receiver of a message within an
anonymity-set {x1, . . . , x|s|}, P (xi) is the a posteriori probability value that is assigned by
the attacker to each member xi of the anonymity-set, and |s| is the actual anonymity-set
size. The main issue with the Effective Anonymity-Set Size metric is that it fails to cal-
culate the Effective Anonymity-Set Size as equal to actual anonymity-set size |s| for the
equally likely case, i. e. P (xi) =
1
|s| .
Independently, Diaz et al. [57] suggests a similar global anonymity measure to nor-
malize the above entropy H(X) by the maximum entropy Hmax = log2|s| , which occurs
when the a posteriori probabilities of the anonymity-set members are equally likely. They
call it the Degree of Anonymity d = H(X)
Hmax
. This metric solves a problem with the Ef-
fective Anonymity-Set Size proposed by Serjantove and Danezis [58] which is lacking of a
measurement reference point. However, unlike Serjantov and danezis, this metric ignores
totally the role of the anonymity-set size. For example, when the a posteriori probabili-
ties are equally likely, H(X) = Hmax , thus Degree of Anonymity d = 1 regardless of the
anonymity-set size |s| .
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A number of information-theoretic efforts have followed Diaz et al. and Serjantov et al.
[57, 58]. Tóth et al. [66] uses a local anonymity metric that is based on maximal a posteriori
probability, which corresponds to the min-entropy, of each anonymity-set member being
compromised. Their main argument is that Shannon entropy measures the average not the
worst-case for each anonymity-set member. Clauß et al. [69] invetigate a generalization for
Shannon entropy, min-entropy, and max-entropy. A particular entropy-based approaches
are taken to use relative entropy in [70] and mutual information in [71, 72] to compare
the a priori and a posteriori knowledeg of the attacker before and after interception of
the anonymity scheme, and measure the information leakage for different traces of the
anonymity scheme.
Realizing that having a non-uniform probability distribution of the anonymity-set mem-
bers is a vulnerability, which opens the door for a variety of threats, stimulates research
different traffic analysis attack scenarios namely, intersection, and predecessor or statistical
disclosure attacks [64, 73], as discussed in section 2.1. These attacks aims at exploiting the
leakage of information due to the non-uniform a posteriori probability distribution.
The novelty of our work stems form that we are studying the problem from a totally
new point of view. Instead of studying what happened to the anonymous communication
system under not-equally likely probabilities of anonymity-set members environment, we
scrutinize the enabling conditions that establish the equally likely case. In addition we
shed a light on how to design and implement a practical solution that guarantees a specific
level-of-anonymity, which is equal to the anonymity-set size, under unconditional security.
These observations prompted us to adopt a unique approach that avoids intersection
attack by using disjoint anonymity-sets with distinct members [14, 17, 18, 19] .This proac-
tive approach has been stated briefly by De Cristofaro et al. [54] as follows,“we can let the
client select the same route for the same queried node. Thus, ADV can not intersect its
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views of query executions”, ( ADV is the adversary). Nevertheless, they did not mention
how to accomplish that since they require all of hops along the source route to respond to
the client’s query. In this work, we maintain the disjoint property of the anonymity-sets
by having the WSN nodes that connect the client to an anonymity-set forward the query
but do not respond to it. To the best of our knowledge this is the first preventive measure
to defend against intersection and statistical attacks.
Moreover, in contrast to [52, 53, 8, 9] that avoid defining anonymous channels, our
secure query k-anonymity notion defines, in an application agnostic manner, the funda-
mental properties of an arbitrary querying protocol to be successful in achieving a specific
level-of-anonymity. Our indistinguishability-based query-anonymity definition has certain
commonalities with [74, 75, 76, 77, 78] in that it follows analogous approaches to what
is used in the formalization of semantically secure encryption schemes [79, 80, 81] to de-
fine the anonymity notion. In addition, our information-theoretic framework shares some
commonalities with [61, 60, 66] in that they all adopt Shannon’s information-theoretic ap-
proach [16] to formalize the notion of anonymity. Yet, our notion stands out in several
aspects.
1. Our notion provides an indistinguisahbility-based characterization of k-anonymity [7,
51] without compromising their standard meaning in the literature [59].
2. It bridges the gap between indistinguishability-based formulation of anonymity no-
tions and the standard, and intuitive concept of anonymity-set in a natural way.
These two anonymity characterizations are treated as alternatives in the litera-
ture [74].
3. It can be related naturally with other security notions namely, Shannon’s Perfect
Secrecy [16].
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4. It extends itself naturally to define the meaning of “secure” for query k-anonymity.
5. It also proves to be beneficial in formulating the design principles of anonymity con-
structions that maintain secure query k-anonymity in the presence of eavesdropping
adversary who intercepts the system for sufficiently long time.
Indeed the absence of a query-anonymity definition that captures the practical con-
cerns of anonymous communication systems motivated this work. The query-anonymity
definition proposed in this work is proved to be helpful in the design, analysis of trade-
off between query-anonymity and communication-cost, and evaluation of provably secure
anonymous communication schemes that are immune to intersection attack. We provide
a summary of the comparison of our work with existing K-Anonymous Communication
Schemes in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Comparison with Existing k-Anonymous Communication Schemes
Criterion Related Work Our Work
Trade-off analysis None or partail X
Disjoint anonymity-Sets X X
Traffic analysis attack Vulnerable Immune
Anonymity metric Probabilistic deterministic
Secure k-anonymity def. X X
Cost-Benefit analysis X X
Location anonymity metrics X X
Attacker Model Mostly Passive Unconditional Passive
Global/Local May differ same power
Collusion/Proxy some are vulnerable X
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Chapter 3
A Theoretical Framework for Secure
K-Anonymous Query Schemes
We consider k-anonymous query schemes in sensor-cloud-based IoT systems which are k-
anonymous communication schemes that provide receiver-anonymity for their clients (see
section 2.2.3). One of the first challenges that we tackle when we seek to analyze the
trade-off between query-anonymity and communication-cost is: how do we define “secure”
in the context of k-anonymous query scheme? In other words, what are the essential
characteristics of a secure k-anonymous query scheme? Then, how do we design a secure k-
anonymous query scheme which never become vulnerable in the presence of eavesdropping
adversary with unlimited time and computational power? How immune is a secure k-
anonymous query scheme to traffic analysis attack in which single or multiple outputs are
intercepted?
Defining the security of secrecy schemes formally is of special importance because these
schemes are designed to operate naturally in malicious environment where adversaries
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try all the possible ways to break them. Under the assumption of some attacker model,
definition of security of a scheme provides a precise idea about what the secrecy scheme
must achieve to prevent the adversary from mounting a successful attack against it. Proof
of security of an instance of a security scheme determines the level at which it satisfies
the definition of security. Furthermore, defining what it means for a secrecy scheme to be
secure, helps in the comparison and evaluation of various security schemes according to
their degree of satisfiability to the definition of security [81].
In this chapter, we provide a formal definition of security of k-anonymous query scheme
building on two well-known security models used for encryption namely, the ciphertext
indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA), and information-theoretic
notion of perfect secrecy [82, 80, 81, 16]. We further shed a light on how to design and
implement a practical solution that guarantees a specific level-of-anonymity under uncon-
ditional security. In Chapter 4, we analyze the Disjoint Anonymity-Sets scheme (DAS) to
prove that it is secure according to our definition of security.
3.1 Notations of k-Anonymous Query Scheme
In this section, we give general notations of a k-anonymous query scheme in the considered
sensor-cloud environment. Let Q denote the set of all possible queries, where each q ∈ Q is
associated with the destination node being queried. Let every node be a valid destination
of a query, i.e., |Q| = n. For simplicity, a reliable communication channel between each
pair of adjacent nodes is available all the time. Dropped messages (queries or responses)
due to bad channels may affect the offered level-of-anonymity of a k-anonymous query,
which is left for future research.
The k-anonymous query scheme provides receiver anonymity service by hiding the ID
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of the destination node of a query in the crowd of other k − 1 queries’ destinations [51, 7,
52, 53, 8, 9]. This is achieved by querying additional k − 1 nodes along with the original
query, such that an adversary cannot learn the true destination of a k-anonymous query
with a probability non-negligibly greater than 1/k by analyzing its traffic patterns [7, 8].
To simplify the exposition, we assume that each query q ∈ Q is sent to one destination
node vd ∈ V [8, 14], where WSN is modeled as a graph G(V,E) ( see section 1.2.2). This
allows us to define a one-to-one correspondence that uniquely maps each query in the query
space to a specific destination node. That is, the destination node of a query q ∈ Q is given
by the function f : Q 7→ V . We define the value of each query and its response abstractly
to be equal to the ID number of its destination node. We refer to a query and its response
by the same symbol q. For example, q1 is a query/response that corresponds to destination
node v1 whose ID number is 1, and so on. We justify this convention by considering the
fact that the main function of k-anonymous query scheme is to conceal the ID number of
destination node of a query/response regardless of its data content. In other words, the
only sensitive information is the ID number of the destination node that is being queried
or responding to a query. Furthermore, the value of k-anonymous query is the ID of its
true destination node.
For q ∈ Q, Pr[Q = q] denotes the probability that the true destination of the k-
anonymous query is q, where Q is a discrete random variable denoting the query value.
This is used to model the fact that an adversary who is conducting traffic analysis against
the k-anonymous query scheme may assign different probabilities to multiple query values
of different destinations based on her prior knowledge. As an example, for a 2-anonymous
query (k = 2) with {q1, q2}, an adversary may know somehow that Pr[Q = q1] = 0.4, and
Pr[Q = q2] = 0.6.
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3.2 A General k-Anonymous Query Construction
A generic k-anonymous query scheme, denoted by (π, T, T−1), is made up of one partition
algorithm and two anonymity transformations, which are defined as follows.
1. π is the partition algorithm which takes as input the whole WSN of size n destination
nodes, and constructs anonymity-sets each of size |s| ∈ [k, 2k − 1] destination nodes
that is required by the anonymity transformation T , where k ∈ [1, n] is the level-
of-anonymity. The case |s| = 1 is when no k-anonymous query can be offered. To
provide uniform anonymity, the size of the anonymity-sets should be a system-wide
constant. For a fixed n and k, let S denotes the set of all possible anonymity-sets.
Recall that the query value is the ID of the corresponding destination node with a
one-to-one correspondence, each anonymity-set s ∈ S is substantially a set of queries
associated with a set of destination nodes of size |s|. For s ∈ S, let Pr[S = s] denote
the probability that the anonymity-set is s, where S is a discrete random variable
taking on the set of possible values of anonymity-sets S. The partition algorithm
may be probabilistic so that it might result in a different set S every time it runs.
2. T : QT → S is the anonymity transformation of one space (i.e., the set of possible
queries QT ) to a second space (i.e., the set of possible anonymity-sets S). We assume
that queries in Q are fully partitioned into multiple sets of QT , denoted by QT, in
such a way that every query is included in one and only one QT . In other words,
QT are disjoint sets. Thus, T maps a query q ∈ QT , which is called true-destination
query, to an anonymity-set s ∈ S, such that s = {q, Sb}. Hence, for every q ∈ QT ,
it holds that: s = T (q)→ q ∈ s. Sb is a set of bogus-destination queries as opposed
to the true-destination query q, i.e. q /∈ Sb. An important technicality is that there
39
is no limitations on the definition of the set of bogus-destination queries Sb as long
as Sb is a proper subset of Q, i.e. Sb ⊂ Q. Based on the affordable cost, s can be as
large as Q in which case maximum level-of-anonymity k = n is provided. That is,
s ⊆ Q. Hence the size of anonymity set |s| ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , n}, where n = |Q| is the
size of WSN.
3. T−1 : S → QT is the inverse transformation of T that maps an anonymity-set s to
the ID number of its true-destination node q. We assume T−1 is a deterministic
procedure that always succeeds. That is T−1(s) = T−1(T (q)) = q.
The transformation T provides anonymity through the concealment of a true-destination
query q within Sb. We stress that, considering a passive eavesdropping adversary A who
sees a single anonymity-set s, for every q ∈ s to be contributing to anonymity with a
none-zero value, it holds that: q ∈ s → (0 < Pr[Q = q] < 1). A special case is when
Pr[Q = q] = 0, which refers to a bogus-destination query that the adversary throws with
no effort. Thus, Pr[Q = q] = 0 is assigned for any q /∈ s if we assume that adversary sees
a single anonymity-set.
To use the described anonymity scheme, the partition algorithm π is first run to generate
anonymity-sets S, in which each set s ∈ S is of size |s| ∈ [k, 2k − 1]. A query q ∈ QT is
selected by the client and this choice information is stored. The particular transformation
T corresponding to QT is applied to the selected query q to produce an anonymity-set
s ∈ S. This anonymity-set s of the destination nodes is queried by a reliable channel that
may be intercepted by an adversary. In addition, the adversary is able to intercept the
responses that client collects from anonymity-set s. Finally, the client applies the inverse
transformation T−1 to the anonymity-set s in order to recover the true destination ID
number, and read its data. Basically, the client drops every response she receives except
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from the true destination.
Note that the adversary a priori information/knowledge is represented by the a priori
probabilities associated with each possible query q ∈ QT to be the true-destination query of
k-anonymous query, before observing the anonymity scheme running. On the other hand,
the a posteriori probabilities of possible queries in QT to be true-destination query, which
is calculated by the adversary after observing the anonymity scheme running, constitute
the adversary a posteriori information/knowledge.
We now investigate the conditions under which the k-anonymous query scheme is
secure in the sense that it leaks no additional information to the adversary [81]. To-
wards that, we introduce an information-theoretic perfect secrecy [16], and adversarial-
indistinguishability [82] definitions of secure query k-anonymity in the presence of eaves-
dropping adversary armed with two types of traffic analysis capabilities namely, intercep-
tion of single anonymity-set and interception of multiple anonymity-sets.
3.3 Interception of single anonymity-set
In this section, we propose two equivalent but powerful definitions of secure query k-
anonymity. Towards the end, we investigate the practical aspects of k-anonymous query
scheme which achieves secure query k-anonymity in the presence of unconditional eaves-
dropping adversary.
3.3.1 Information-Theoretic Perfect Secrecy Approach
We start by proposing a definition for query k − anonymity.
41
Definition 1 (query k − anonymity). An anonymity scheme (π, T, T−1) achieves query
k − anonymity against eavesdropping adversary A if ∀A, ∀qj ∈ QT , where QT constitutes
the input space of T , ∀s ∈ S that are resulted from s = T (qj), there exists a subset of unique
queries Qk = {q1, . . . , qj, . . . , qk} where Qk ⊆ QT , k = |Qk| ∈ [1, |QT |], we call the subset
of indistinguishable queries Qk, such that the calculated probabilities by the adversary over
Qk during traffic analysis (the a posteriori probabilities) are equally likely,
Pr[Q = qi | S = s] =
1
k
, ∀qi ∈ Qk (3.1)
It is easy to see that the case of k = 1 offers no anonymity, while in the case of
k = |QT |, the a posteriori probabilities that A associates with each of QT ’s members being
the true-destination query are equally likely.
Now, the apriori information of A comes merely from the fact that the adversary
is allowed to learn the details of the anonymity scheme by the security by transparency
requirement [16, 83]. This adversary prior information is that the true-destination query
is chosen at random out of QT , the input space of anonymity transformation T . Thus, the
apriori probability distribution over QT is uniform,
Pr[Q = qi] =
1
|QT |
, ∀qi ∈ QT (3.2)
If the anonymity scheme is so secure that it leaks no additional information to the
adversary when it is executed, the adversary information stays at its prior level. Hence,
adversary a posteriori knowledge represented by a posteriori probabilities are the same
as a priori knowledge that is represented by a priori probabilities. As indicated before,
this point acts as the maximum level-of-anonymity ( k = |QT | and Qk = QT ) that can
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be obtained from the anonymity scheme. By substituting the value of k = |QT | in a
posteriori probabilities equation of query k−anonymity (equation 3.1), a posteriori prob-
abilities come to be equal to a priori probabilities as defined in equation 3.2. Now we
have the position to provide an information-theoretic-based definition for the secure query
k − anonymity which is equivalent to the indistinguishability-based definition introduced
in section 3.3.2:
Definition 2 (secure k-anonymous query scheme). An anonymity scheme (π, T, T−1)
achieves secure query k − anonymity, at which k = min
QT∈QT
|QT |, and |QT | = Θ(k), against
eavesdropping adversary A if and only if ∀A, ∀q ∈ QT , where QT constitutes the input
space of T , ∀s ∈ S that are resulted from s = T (q), the calculated probabilities by the
adversary over QT during traffic analysis (the a posteriori probabilities) have a uniform
distribution, and are same as the a priori probabilities. That is, Pr[Q = qi | S = s] =
Pr[Q = qi] =
1
|QT |
, ∀qi ∈ QT .
Stated another way, the necessary and sufficient condition to achieve secure query
k− anonymity is that the a posteriori probabilities are same as the a priori probabilities.
Interestingly enough, using the information theory terminology [84, 61, 60], the entropy
H(Q) of a posteriori probabilities, which is a measure of uncertainty, is equal to the entropy
of the a priori probabilities, and it is at its maximum value Hmax(Q) = log2 |QT | since
the probabilities are equiprobable. That is since all possible events are equiprobable, the
adversary uncertainty about the true-destination query is the highest. Another way of
interpreting Definition 2 is that the probability distributions of true-destination query over
the input space QT of the anonymity transformation T , and over its output space S are
independent.
Remark 1. For a desired level-of-anonymity k, the secure query k − anonymity scheme
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is designed to have the subset of indistinguishable queries Qk ⊆ QT equal to its input space
QT . That is Qk = QT , and |QT | = k. However, when Q is partitioned into a set of QT ,
it is possible that n is not divisible by k. In this case, different QT ∈ Q will have different
sizes specifically, |QT | ∈ [k, 2k − 1]. Therefore, we have |QT | = Θ(k). In Definition 2
above, we determine k for a secure query k − anonymity to be equal to the lowest size of
QT ∈ QT. This is because ∀QT ∈ QT, it holds that: the maximum size of indistinguishable
queries subset Qk ⊆ QT is equal to the lowest size of QT ∈ QT. This renders a compelling
application of the concept of weakest link of the security chain [83, 85] in the context of
anonymity. That is, the anonymity chain is only as strong as its weakest link.
3.3.2 Adversarial-Indistinguishability Approach
To provide an indistinguishability-based definition of secure query k-anonymity, we use the
following game with adversary A, challenger C, WSN of size n, and the anonymity scheme
(π, T, T−1). The game is the query-anonymity analogue to ciphertext indistinguishability
under chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA) property of cryptographic schemes [82, 81]. A
cryptographic scheme possess IND-CPA property if the adversary fails to distinguish pairs
of ciphertexts based on their corresponding pairs of plaintexts with a probability greater
than random guess.
The game assumes that the partition algorithm has been run for a specific value of
level-of-anonymity k on WSN of size n, and therefore the set of anonymity-sets S are
constructed. We illustrate the game pictorially in Fig. 3.1.
The adversarial Indistinguishability game G(A, T )
1. The adversary A chooses two arbitrary queries qi, qj ∈ QT , qi 6= qj, and send them to
the challenger C.
44
2. The challenger C replies with the anonymity transformation of one of the two queries
denoted by qb. That is, it replies with the anonymity set s = T (qb) , after choosing
a random bit b ∈R {i, j}, where ∈R denotes choose at random.
3. The adversary A replies with b′ ∈ {i, j}
4. The challenger C decides the adversary’s success if b′ = b
CHALLENGER ADVERSARY
qi, qj ϵ QT
s=T(qb), bϵR {i,j}
 b' ϵ {i,j}
Figure 3.1: The adversarial Indistinguishability game G(A, T )
We say that the anonymity scheme is secure or offers adversarial indistinguishability if
the adversary’s success is no better than a random guess. We are now ready for the formal
definition.
Definition 3 (Perfect Indistinguishability). We say that an anonymity scheme (π, T, T−1)
is perfectly indistinguishable in the presence of unconditional eavesdropping adversary A if
∀A, ∀ qi, qj ∈ QT , where QT constitute the input space of T , ∀ s ∈ S that are resulted from
s = T (qb) as described in the game G(A, T ), where b ∈ {i, j} , it must hold that:
Pr[Q = qi | S = s] = Pr[Q = qj | S = s] =
1
2
The main goal of secure k-anonymous query anonymity scheme is to guarantee that an
adversary can not learn the true destination of a k-anonymous query with a probability
non-negligibly greater than 1/k by analyzing its traffic patterns [7, 8]. By proving Lemma 1
and Theorem 1 below, we seek to establish the relation between secure query k-anonymity
and the perfect indistinguishability as stated in definition 3.
45
On the other hand, by intercepting the anonymity-sets, the adversary may gain addi-
tional information which can lower the level-of-anonymity offered by a vulnerable anonymity
scheme. In the rest of this section, we will investigate the conditions under which the
anonymity scheme is secure in the sense that it leaks no additional information to the
adversary [16, 86, 81]. We seek to establish that by proving Lemma 1 and Theorem 2
below.
Lemma 1. All q ∈ QT that constitute the input space of a particular anonymity trans-
formation T of a perfectly indistinguishable anonymity scheme (π, T, T−1), as described by
Definition 3, must belong to the same anonymity-set s, that is QT ⊆ s, and |s| = |T (q)| ≥
|QT |.
Proof. We prove by contradiction. If not all q ∈ QT that constitute the input space of a
particular anonymity transformation T of a perfectly indistinguishable anonymity scheme
(π, T, T−1) belong to the same anonymity-set, then there exist at least two queries qi, qj
that belong to different anonymity-sets namely, qi ∈ s, and qj ∈ s′. Now when the game
G(A, t) is executed, let us assume the adversary A chooses qi, qj and send them to the
Challenger C. It is obvious that A always succeeds in distinguishing the true destination
of the anonymity-set that she receives from C with probability 1. For instance, when he
receives s,
Pr[Q = qi | S = s] = 1, P r[Q = qj | S = s] = 0. This contradicts Definition 3, and the
result follows.
The result also follows from Definition 1. For the sake of contradiction, assume oth-
erwise that not all q ∈ QT belong to the same anonymity-set. Thus, in the eye of ad-
versary who intercepts such anonymity-set, the size of subset of indistinguishable queries
|Qk| < |QT |. This is so because Qk ⊆ QT from Definition 1, and not all of QT appear in s
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by assumption. That is, k < |QT |. This contradicts Definition 2 and Remark 1 of secure
query k − anonymity scheme. Hence all q ∈ QT must belong to the same anonymity-set
s. Consequently QT ⊆ s, and |s| = |T (q)| ≥ |QT |.
Theorem 1. A perfectly indistinguishable anonymity scheme (π, T, T−1) achieves secure
query k-anonymity with k = |QT |.
Proof. The proof is straightforward once we run the game G(A, T ) multiple of times that
is sufficient to cover all the possible combinations resulted from choosing the two queries qi
and qj arbitrarily out of QT . This entails that every q ∈ QT is indistinguishable from the
rest of queries in QT because of the pair-wise indistinguishability. Stated another way, the
anonymity-set s of every q ∈ QT which results from s = T (q) contains no information about
the true-destination query q. From lemma 1, all q ∈ QT belongs to the same anonymity-set
s. This permits every q ∈ QT to act as a legitimate candidate of a true-destination query
in the eye of the adversary who intercepts the anonymity-set s. Hence, to the adversary
who observes the anonymity-set s, all q ∈ QT are indistinguishable from each other. That
is, the a posteriori probability distribution which is calculated by the adversary over QT
is uniform,
Pr[Q = qi | S = s] =
1
|QT |
, ∀ qi ∈ QT (3.3)
Consequently a perfectly indistinguishable anonymity scheme (π, T, T−1) achieves secure
query k-anonymity, where k = |QT |.
An observation we can make from the proof of Lemma 1 above is that, an anonymity
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scheme that achieves a secure query k−anonymity of level k provides all levels of anonymity
that are less than k. This property is important when we consider WSN of size n that is
not divisible by the level-of-anonymity k. We sate that formally in Corollary 1 below.
Corollary 1. A secure query k−anonymity scheme achieves all levels of anonymity ≤ k.
Proof. The results follows directly from Definition 2 of secure query k−anonymity scheme
which states that queries in QT are indistinguishable from each other. Thus, queries in any
subset Qs of QT are also indistinguishable from each other. That is, the achieved query
k − anonymity is of level k = |Qs| ∈ [1, min
QT∈QT
|QT |] since k = min
QT∈QT
|QT | for secure query
k− anonymity scheme, as in Definition 2. Hence secure query k− anonymity provides all
levels of anonymity less than or equal to k.
We now consider the practical aspects of the anonymity scheme which achieves secure
query k − anonymity. We basically subtract any incidental communication overhead cost
without pulling down the offered level-of-anonymity, or contaminating the secrecy of the
scheme. A simple consequence of Lemma 1 is the following.
Theorem 2. To achieve secure query k−anonymity, it is sufficient to have the anonymity-
set the same as the input space of the anonymity transformation, and the level-of-anonymity
k equal to the size of the anonymity-set s. That is, s = T (q) = QT , and k = |s| = |T (q)| =
|QT |.
Proof. The result follows from Lemma 1, where for a secure query k− anonymity scheme,
we have k = |QT |, QT ⊆ s, and |s| = |T (q)| ≥ |QT |. Furthermore, k = |QT | is the
maximum level-of-anonymity that a query k− anonymity scheme can provide as stated in
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Definition 1. This implies that all queries q ∈ QT are indistinguishable from each other.
Hence the queries in s\QT , if any, are dummy queries contributing nothing to the level-of-
anonymity. They just incur unnecessary communication overhead cost that we can avoid
safely by having s = T (q) = QT . Thus, it is sufficient to have the anonymity-set the same
as QT , and hence, the level-of-anonymity k equal to the size of the anonymity-set |s|, i.e
k = |s| = |T (q)| = |QT |.
We emphasize that in Theorem 2 and its proof we put no constraint on different
anonymity-sets used to anonymize the same true-destination query. This is so because
the adversary interception capability is restricted to a single anonymity-set.
3.4 Interception of multiple anonymity-sets
In this section, we investigate if the secure query k−anonymity, as formalized in Definition
2 for the single anonymity-set interception, is still guaranteed when multiple anonymity-
sets interception is engaged. Furthermore, we formulate the design principles of anonymity
constructions that maintain secure query k − anonymity in such a vulnerable setting.
The capability of the adversary to intercept multiple anonymity-sets opens the door to
more sophisticated attacks than just plain traffic analysis. The well-known types of such
attacks are the long-term intersection, and statistical disclosure attack, [36, 37, 38, 35, 38,
64, 39, 40], as discussed in section 2.1.2. With the intersection attack, the adversary ob-
serves a large volume of network traffic in order to re-identify client’s targeted destination.
The adversary succeeded in breaking the anonymity scheme if the client maintains a con-
sistent pattern of communications over time that leaks some information. By performing
different non-empty intersection operations on the traced anonymity-sets, the adversary
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may gain information about the true anonymized value. Specific to our setting, this infor-
mation leakage may result in non-uniform a posteriori probabilities of the different queries
in the input space of the anonymity transformation namely, QT , leading to violation of the
secure query k − anonymity requirements as defined in Definition 2.
We make clear that the intent of this work is not to study the performance of the
anonymity scheme that is vulnerable to intersection attack, but rather to investigate the
design principles that help preventing the intersection attack. Note that the defence against
intersection attack is an open problem that is difficult to solve efficiently [41, 42]. In
particular, the disclosure attack is shown to be NP-complete. For example, the hitting
set attack is one of the efforts for improving the computational efficiency of disclosure
attack [87]. In turn, this complicates the measurement of anonymity under intersection
attack, and makes the offered level-of-anonymity unpredictable. For that reason, prior work
[52, 53, 7, 8, 9] which allows intersection attack avoids defining anonymous channel and
measuring offered level-of-anonymity precisely, let alone analyzing the trade-off between
query k−anonymity and communication-cost along the whole range of level-of-anonymity.
As a prelude to determining the impact of intersection attack under our setting, we
consider the following simplified example. Alice visited two hospitals for medication. A
first rumor circulated in the press after Alice visited hospital A that she has either heart
disease or flue, which we denote by anonymity-set s1 = {heart, f lue}. A second rumor
circulated after Alice visited hospital B that she has either diabetes or heart disease, which
we denote by anonymity-set s2 = {diabetes, heart}. Since Alice is the same person about
whom both rumors talk, a significant amount of information about Alice’s true disease has
been leaked to the hones-but-curious adversary. In fact the intersection attack between the
two anonymity-sets in the example is so sever that it discloses Alic’s real disease with high
probability. It is easy to see that the intersection s1 ∩ s2 = {heart} results in one value for
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Alice’s real disease namely, heart disease. This in turn causes a posteriori probability that
adversary assigns to heart disease to be higher than a posteriori probabilities she assigns
to flue or diabetes. Thus heart disease is the most probable value of Alice’s real disease.
In this case, the a posteriori probabilities will be different from the a priori probabilities
which have a uniform distribution intuitively. Hence the secure query k − anonymity is
sacrificed.
We point out that our setting is analogous to that of the above example in the sense
that the query k−anonymity scheme hides the interest of the same client who queries the
WSN multiple of times. Therefore the intersection of multiple anonymity-sets means the
same query (same destination node) appears in different anonymity-sets. Again, this makes
it more probable than other queries to be the true-destination query, and thus violates the
main property of secure query k − anonymity namely, uniform a posteriori distribution.
It follows from the proceeding that to maintain secure query k − anonymity, the in-
tersection among the multiple outputs of the anonymity transformation T traced by the
adversary namely, multiple anonymity-sets, must be empty. We formalize this in Theorem
3 below.
Theorem 3. Let (π, T, T−1) denotes an anonymity scheme that achieves secure query
k− anonymity against eavesdropping adversary with the single anonymity-set interception
capability. Let s = T (q) denotes the resulted anonymity-set from anonymizing a query
q ∈ QT , and let QT denote input space of anonymity transformation T . If eavesdropping
adversary is capable of incorporating information gained from observing Ni ∈ [1,∞] runs
of the anonymity scheme (π, T, T−1), which resulted in Ni different anonymity-sets whose
intersection contains the same query qi, i.e. same destination node i ∈ [1, n] in a WSN
of n nodes, then the joint necessary and sufficient condition to preserve secure query k −
anonymity, as defined in Definition 2, is that the anonymity-sets are disjoint and s = QT .
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Proof. Sufficiency: since the anonymity-sets are disjoint, it is impossible for the adversary
who observes the anonymity scheme to assign a higher a posteriori probability to any of
the destinations (query values) than others in the same anonymity-sets. Hence the a poste-
riori probabilities have a uniform distribution notwithstanding the number of intercepted
anonymity-sets. It is easy to see that when s = QT , the a posteriori probabilities and the
a priori probabilities are the same, and each of them equal to 1|QT | , which achieves secure
query k−anonymity as in Definition 2. It worth noting that, on its own, the first condition
is not sufficient to provide secure query k−anonymity for which we have to show that the
aposteriori probabilities are the same as the a priori probabilities. The second condition
namely, s = QT jointly with the first one assures that.
Necessity: For the purpose of contradiction, assume otherwise that the intersection
among anonymity-sets is not empty. Because the true-destination query of k-anonymous
query reflects the interest of the same client, a query that is contained in the intersection
of different anonymity-sets becomes more probable than others resulting in a non-uniform
distribution for the a posteriori probabilities. This contradicts the requirements of the
secure query k − anonymity as in Definition 2. We claim that s = QT is an implied
necessary condition to have the intersection among different anonymity-sets empty.
To see why, we stress that Q is fully partitioned into a set of QT , which we denote
by QT, such that subsets QT are pairwise disjoint. By assumption, the anonymity scheme
(π, T, T−1) achieves secure query k−anonymity therefore QT ⊆ s as asserted in Lemma 1.
Since s ⊆ Q, QT ⊆ Q, QT ⊆ s, and the subsets QT are disjoint, then s\QT must be empty
to have anonymity-sets s ∈ S disjoint. To prove this, assume otherwise, for the purpose
of contradiction. That is, s \ QT is not empty, and anonymity-sets s ∈ S are disjoint.
Thus, given that QT i ⊆ si as in Lemma 1, there exists at least one destination node vi
that is in an anonymity-set si but its corresponding query qi is not in QT i. Since Q is fully
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partitioned into QT, then qi must belong to another member of QT say, qi ∈ QTj. But
QTj ⊆ sj by Lemma 1, where sj 6= si. This implies that the corresponding destination
node of qi belongs to sj. That is vi ∈ sj. Hence, si ∩ sj = vi, thereby giving us the desired
contradiction.
Consequently, the two conditions namely, the anonymity-sets are disjoint and s = QT ,
are necessary to preserve secure query k − anonymity in the presence of eavesdropping
adversary who is capable of multiple anonymity-sets interception.
Remark 2. While the result s = QT from Theorem 2, and Theorem 3 are similar, the dis-
tinction between their arguments is important. The former argues from totally an econom-
ical viewpoint, while the latter proves that the result is a prerequisite to assure secure query
k− anonymity against eavesdropping adversary with multiple anonymity-sets interception
capability. A key element in Theorem 3, which is also of independent interest, is that it
establishes the relationship between the set of bogus-destination queries Sb and the queries
in QT , the input space of anonymity transformation T , specifically, s = {q, Sb} = QT .
Corollary 2. An anonymity scheme (π, T, T−1), which achieves secure query k−anonymity
against eavesdropping adversary with multiple anonymity-sets interception capability, pro-
vides a level-of-anonymity equal to the lowest size of the anonymity-sets, that is, k =
min
s∈S
|s|, where |s| = Θ(k).
Proof. The results follows intermediately from Theorem 3. Since k = min
QT∈QT
|QT | in secure
query k − anonymity as in definition 2, and min
QT∈QT
|QT | = min
s∈S
|s| by theorem 3 which
asserts that QT = s, we have the desired result k = min
s∈S
|s|. Also, since |QT | = Θ(k) by
definition 2, we have |s| = |QT | = Θ(k).
53
Based on the results obtained in Theorem 3 and Corollary 2 , the following conventions
will be used alternatively when we consider secure query k − anonymity:
• Since k = |s|, we will use the level-of-anonymity k and the size of anonymity-set |s|
alternatively as a measure to quantify the secure query k − anonymity.
• Another implication of Theorem 3 is related to the partition algorithm π which
constructs a set of anonymity-sets S out of the whole WSN. Since s = QT , from
Theorem 3, each constructed anonymity-set s ∈ S is basically the input space of the
anonymity transformation QT .
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Chapter 4
Disjoint Anonymity-Sets (DAS): A
Construction for a Secure
K-Anonymous Query Scheme
In this chapter, the problem of designing a secure k-anonymous query scheme following
Theorem 3 is formulated. Based on the generic construction presented in section 3.2, we
propose an anonymity scheme, we call the Disjoint Anonymity-Sets (DAS), that achieves
secure query k-anonymity as stated in Definition 2 in the presence of eavesdropping adver-
sary armed with multiple anonymity-sets interception capability.
4.1 Disjoint Anonymity-Sets (DAS) Scheme
DAS is made up of one partition algorithm π and two anonymity transformations T and
T−1, as described below:
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1. π is the partition algorithm that converts the whole WSN of size n into a union of
disjoint non-empty anonymity-sets. Specifically, the inputs of the algorithm include
WSN of size n, and k ∈ [1, n] the desired level-of-anonymity. It outputs a partition
of WSN containing a set disjoint anonymity-sets S = {s1, . . . , sbn/kc}, where ∪s∈S =
WSN , and each s ∈ S is of size |s| = [k, 2k−1]. The upper limit point of anonymity-
set size, which is 2k− 1, captures that fact that n may not be divisible by k. Hence,
there exists at least one anonymity-set of size in the closed interval [k, 2k − 1].
2. T is the anonymity transformation that maps every query q in its input space QT ∈
QT to the corresponding anonymity-set s ∈ S, i.e., ∀q ∈ QT ,∃s = T (q), where q ∈ s.
This means whenever the client wants to send a query q to a destination node, she is
required to query each node in its corresponding anonymity-set s. Moreover s = QT ,
and thus the partition algorithm π defines not only the set of anonymity-sets S but
also the set of input spaces of anonymity transformation QT.
Since the DAS anonymity-sets are disjoint, the input spaces of T are disjoint too,
which by nature resists all types of intersection and statistical attacks among different
anonymity-sets [36, 37, 38]. This assures a certain level-of-anonymity regardless of
the computational power of the eavesdropping adversary who is able to intercept the
anonymity scheme for sufficiently long time.
3. T−1 is the inverse transformation that recovers the true-destination query from
anonymity-set of the responses to the queries generated by anonymity transformation
T . That is T−1s = T−1(T (q)) = q. Note that T and T−1 can both be performed by
the client which meets the requirements of trust-none model ( se section 1.2.1). It is
interesting to note that the existence of T−1 verifies the correctness of the anonymity
scheme in much the same manner that decryption does for the encryption scheme.
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Theorem 4. The DAS scheme is a secure k-anonymous query scheme with a level-of-
anonymity equal to the lowest size of anonymity-sets, i.e. k = min
s∈S
|s|.
Proof. We must show that the DAS achieves level-of-anonymity k = |QT | in the presence of
eavesdropping adversary as stated in Definition 2. However this is immediately follows from
the fact that DAS is designed to satisfy the conditions to achieve secure query k-anonymity
namely, anonymity-sets are disjoint and each of them equal to the corresponding QT , as
stated in Theorem 3. This is so because every q ∈ QT is mapped to the same s = QT .
Hence, it is indistinguishable in k = |s| = |QT |. Now, since n, WSN size, is not necessarily
divisible by k, DAS partitioning leads to |s| ∈ [k, 2k−1]. We apply the well-known concept
of weakest-link in security [83], the anonymity chain is only as strong as its weakest link
to have k = min
s∈S
|s|, which is also established in Corollary 2 .
4.2 Proposed DAS Scheme Design and Implementa-
tion
Detailed implementation to each of the sub-tasks under DAS in the context of square grid
WSN is provided in this section.
4.2.1 The Partition Algorithm




n) that has been widely
employed in the related research [8], where the position of each node is defined by the
ordered pair of its Cartesian coordinates (i, j), where i, j ∈ [1,
√
n]. As in prior work [8],
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the client communicates directly with root-node v1,1, which is the node at the upper left
corner. The route between the root-node and any node is the shortest Manhattan distance.
Note that Manhattan distance dm between two nodes vi1,j1 and vi2,j2 is equal to the length
of the path connecting them along the horizontal and vertical segments [88].
The following theorem formally defines the proposed partition algorithm, and its proof
justifies its feasibility.




n square grid connected undirected graph G = (V,E), there
exists a partition of V into disjoint sets of nodes S = {s1, s2, . . . , sbn/kc} each of size
∈ [k, 2k − 1], the DAS anonymity-sets, such that the following properties hold:
1. The set of nodes {v1, v2, . . . , v|sj |} in such anonymity-set sj has the following total
ordering. Given i ∈ [1, |sj| − 1], it holds that the Manhattan distance between nodes
vi and vi+1 is exactly 1.
2. v1 (the first-node from the source along the route) is at the lowest vertical distance
(y-coordinate) from the root-node v1,1 compared to other nodes in such anonymity-set
sj.




4. The remainder out of partition n/k is distributed over anonymity-sets S using either
First-Set-Spread (FSS), Equal-Spread (ES), or Random-Spread (RS) anonymity-sets
construction methods (which will be defined right below).
The properties (1) - (3) in the theorem ensure that the communication-cost is minimized
when querying multiple sensor nodes in an anonymity-set, by which v1 (the first-node along
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the route) is at the least vertical distance from v1,1, while all the other nodes of the same
anonymity-set is confined within a vertical distance of d|s|/
√
ne from v1.
The property (4) in the theorem ensures that the remainder nodes out of the partition
n/k is distributed over the anonymity-sets by using one of the following three anonymity-
sets construction methods. The first is called First-Set-Spread (FSS), which adds all the
remaining nodes to the first set closet to the root-node in order to lower the communication-
cost because the first set is the closet to the root-node. The second is called Equal-
Spread (ES), which goes to the other extreme by distributing the remainder equally over
all the anonymity-sets. Whereas the Random-Spread (RS) adopts the uniform random
distribution to disseminate the remaining nodes randomly across anonymity-sets. The
three methods will be examined in Chapter 6.
For the proof of existence of such disjoint anonymity-sets, our approach is to introduce





and its resultant partition meets all the properties listed in theorem 5. The algorithm
calls four other procedures, namely ConstructSpanningTree that constructs a comb-like
spanning tree t of G, ConstructHamiltonianPath that constructs the Hamiltonian path
P of t, FindAnonymitySetsSizes that determines the size of each anonymity-set, and
ConstructOneAnonymitySet that constructs one anonymity-set. A working example of
the algorithm that uses First-Set-Spread (FSS) is shown in Fig. 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: An example of running the partition algorithm shown in Algorithm 1 on 4× 4
square grid connected undirected graph, and its procedures.We use Algorithm 1, with an
input value of k = 3, to partition the graph G = (V,E) on the far left into five disjoint
anonymity-sets S = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5}. First, We construct a comb-like spanning tree shown
in the second graph from left using Breadth First Search (BFS) algorithm. We adopt a
stepwise construction of the tree in which the sequence of steps is numbered on the dia-
gram. Next we construct, in the third graph from left, Hamiltonian path in two iterations
of ConstructHamiltonianPath procedure. Finally, we use ConstructOneAnonymitySet
procedure, shown on the the right, to traverse the Hamiltonian path and generate the
desired disjoint anonymity-sets. Since n = 16 is indivisible by k = 3 and we are using FSS
anonymity-set construction method, the largest anonymity-set s1 is the first to be created,
and it is the closest to the root node v1,1.
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n square grid connected undirected
graph G = (V,E), a desired level of anonymity k ∈ [1, n], and an anonymity-sets construc-
tion method (ascm). In line 2, we call ConstructSpanningTree to generate a comb-like
spanning tree t of G. Then, we invoke ConstructHamiltonianPath on t in line 3.
In ConstructSpanningTree, line 10, we invoke Breadth First Search (BFS) [89, 90] at
root-node, v1,1, which visits all of its adjacent nodes from left to right. Then for each of
these adjacent nodes in turn, BFS visits their adjacent nodes from left to right if they are
unvisited before, and continues in a similar manner. This forms a comb-like spanning tree
as shown in Fig. 4.2 that has one spine of length
√





n, along the x axis.
In ConstructHamiltonianPath, line 12, we convert the comb-like spanning tree t into
a Hamiltonian path P . We accomplish this by removing some edges and replacing them
with others in different locations. For doing this, In line 13, we iterate i through the range
of rows in the square grid. That is, it takes on values from 1 through
√
n. In line 14, we
limit i values to odd numbers. In the ith iteration, we remove the edge between each two
consecutive rows (i and i + 1) for odd values of i, and join them by an edge on the last
column, as in lines 15 and 16.
To see why, refer to the comb-like tree t shown in the second graph from left of Fig.
4.1. To convert t into a Hamiltonian path, we need to: remove the edges joining the first




, leave the edge between the second and the third rows intact, and repeat the remove
and insertion between the third and fourth rows. This is done in two iterations of the for
loop in line 13, as indicated on the resultant Hamiltonian path in Fig. 4.1.
Back to the main body of Algorithm 1, we determine the size of each anonymity-set by
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Algorithm 1 Partition Algorithm (π)




n Square grid connected undirected graph , k: a desired level-of-anonymity, and ascm: an
anonymity-sets construction method
Output: S: the partition of G into disjoint anonymity-sets
1: n← |V |
2: t← ConstructSpanningTree(G)
3: P ← ConstructHamiltonianPath(t)
4: {|si| |i ∈ [1, bn/kc]} ← FindAnonymitySetsSizes(ascm, n, k)
5: foreach i ∈ [1, bn/kc] do
6: si ← ConstructOneAnonymitySet(P, |si|)
7: P ← P with all nodes of si removed
8: end for
9: return S← {si|i ∈ [1, bn/kc]}
10: procedure ConstructSpanningTree(G′)
11: return t′ ← BFS(G′) starting at root-node v1,1 /* BFS is the Breadth First Search algorithm */
12: procedure ConstructHamiltonianPath(t′)
/* t′ is a comb-like tree constructed by ConstructSpanningTree procedure above */
13: for i← 1 to
√
n do
14: if i is odd then
15: Remove the edge between nodes (i, 1) and (i+ 1, 1) in t′
16: Insert an edge between nodes (i,
√





19: return P ′ ← t′
20: procedure FindAnonymitySetsSizes(ascm′, n′, k′)
21: foreach i ∈ [1, bn′/k′c] do
22: |s′i| ← k′
23: end for
24: r ← n′ mod k′
25: if ascm = FSS then
26: |s′1| ← |s′1|+ r
27: else if ascm = ES then
28: foreach j ∈ [1, r] do
29: x← j mod bn′/k′c
30: if x = 0 then
31: x← bn′/k′c
32: end if
33: |s′x| ← |s′x|+ 1
34: end for
35: else if ascm = RS then
36: foreach j ∈ [1, r] do
37: x← RandomNumberGenerator(1, bn′/k′c)
38: |s′x| ← |s′x|+ 1
39: end for
40: end if
41: return {|s′i| |i ∈ [1, bn′/k′c]}
42: procedure ConstructOneAnonymitySet(P ′, l)
43: if l > number of nodes in P ′ then
44: return error
45: end if
46: Pre-order traverse P ′ /* traverse from the the root-node, v1,1 */
47: return a set containing the first l nodes we encounter
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calling FindAnonymitySetsSizes in line 4. This step is a prelude to assigning nodes to
these anonymity-sets which is done in lines 5 to 8. In FindAnonymitySetsSizes, we set
up an iterator, i, through all the anonymity-sets which takes values from 1 till bn/kc, line
21. In each iteration, we initialize the ith anonymity-set, |s′i|, to be equal to the desired
level-of-anonymity, k′. This is the minimum size of an anonymity-set since the anonymity-
set size is in [k, 2k − 1]. In line 24, we calculate the remainder r out of the partition n/k
using modulo operation.
Then, starting at line 25, we use if-else if statement to stress the fact that either
one of the three anonymity-sets construction method (ascm), FSS, ES, or RS, is used.
As mentioned in the proceeding paragraphs, these methods are used to distribute the
remainder r over anonymity-sets. Simply, the FSS adds all the remaining nodes r to the
first anonymity-set in line 26. Recall that ES attempts to add equal share of the remaining
nodes r to each anonymity-set. Thus, we first set up an iterator, j, which takes values from
1 till the remainder r, line 28. In each iteration, we select an anonymity-set indexed by x
sequentially, lines 29 to 32. Then, we increment its size by one node from the remaining
nodes in line 33. Finally, for the RS, we again set up an iterator, j, which takes values from
1 till the remainder r, line 36. In each iteration, we increase the size of an anonymity-set
whose index x is selected by a random number generator following the uniform distribution,
lines 37 and 38.
In line 5 of the main body of the partition algorithm, we set up an iterator, i, through
all the anonymity-sets which takes values from 1 till bn/kc. In each iteration, we call
ConstructOneAnonymitySet, line 6, to construct the ith anonymity-set. Then, we update
the Hamiltonian path by removing the nodes of constructed ith anonymity-set from it, as
in line 7. Finally, after finishing the for loop in line 9, we return the partition S of G,
which is a collection of anonymity-sets.
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In ConstructOneAnonymitySet, we treat the Hamiltonian path p′, which is one of the
inputs in addition to an integer l, as a simple example of a tree. In line 46, we traverse
the tree in a pre-order way [91]. That is, we recursively visit parent node from left to right
before visiting their children node. In essence, this means we walk down the Hamiltonian
path P ′ from its endpoint that is the root-node. In the last line, 47, we return the first l
nodes we encounter to create one anonymity-set.
An important assertion is that the path from the root-node to any other vertex v in
t is the shortest path from root-node to v in G. This can be easily verified via the fact
that each connected graph has a spanning tree [90], as well as the fact that the shortest
path spanning tree t can be built via Breadth First Search (BFS) [89, 90] which we include
in the procedure ConstructSpanningTree of the algorithm. Respectively, we derive the
Hamiltonian path from the same spanning tree that we will use later for routing queries
to the anonymity-sets, and collecting their responses, see section 4.2.2.
Note that the anonymity-sets are contiguous since all the nodes are possibly queried.
Thus in the algorithm, we generate these anonymity-sets as a result of splitting a continuous
path originating at the root-node to ensure the continuity requirement. On the other
hand, since the path must be a Hamiltonian path that visits every node in WSN once, the
disjointedness requirement is naturally met.
Time Complexity: We show that time of running Algorithm 1 on G = (V,E) is
linear in the number of nodes |V | = n. First, the Initialization in line 1 takes O(1)





n square grid graph, we observe that |V | = n, and |E| = 2(n −
√
n). Hence
ConstructSpanningTree takes O(|V |+ |E|) = O(n+ 2(n−
√
n)) = O(n).
In ConstructHamiltonianPath, the for loop costs O(
√
n) due to a constant time
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(b) Comb-like Binary Spanning Tree
Figure 4.2: An example of comb-like rooted binary spanning tree construction algorithm
using BFS for 4× 4 square grid connected undirected graph. (a) Stepwise construction of
the tree in which the sequence of steps is numbered on the diagram, (b) the resultant tree
consumed by the execution of the body of the loop. FindAnonymitySetsSizes in line 4
yields O(n) of running time. This is so because its cost is mainly of two parts namely, the
foreach loop and the if-else if statement, and each one of them is in O(n) as follows.
The foreach in line 21 costs bn/kc since its body takes constant time. But k ∈ [1, n],
therefore foreach is in O(n). The FSS case, line 25, of if-else if costs a constant time,
i.e O(1). The ES case costs the same of its foreach loop in line 28 which performs a
constant time block r times. Recall that r, the remainder out of the devision n/k, is
in O(k) which is in turn in O(n). Hence the ES case is in O(n). Finally, the RS case
is in O(n) because its foreach performs a constant time block of code r times. The
foreach loop in lines 5–8 performs ConstructOneAnonymitySet and the remove of si
nodes operation, line 7, bn/kc times. Considering ConstructOneAnonymitySet, lines
42–45 costs a constant time, and the Pre-order, line 46, traverse only |si| nodes of the
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Hamiltonian path. The remove operation, line 7, removes |si| nodes from the Hamiltonian
path. Since |si| ∈ [k, 2k−1] (see section 4.1), each of ConstructOneAnonymitySet and the
remove operation, line 7, takes time Θ(k). Therefore, we can state the running time of the
for loop in lines 5–8 as O(bn/kc× (k+ k) = O(n/k× 2k) = O(n). Consequently, the total
running time of the Partition algorithm, which is equal to the sum of the time taken by
ConstructSpanningTree, ConstructHamiltonianPath, FindAnonymitySetsSizes, and
the foreach loop in lines 5–8, is O(n+
√
n+ n+ n) = O(n).
Now we are able to prove the existence of a valid partition according to Theorem 5,
which also proves the correctness of the Partition algorithm.
Proof for Theorem 5. Firstly we argue that by implementing the Partition Algorithm 1,
the generated anonymity-sets are disjoint since each of them is obtained by splitting a
Hamiltonian path of length n into path segments of size in [k, 2k − 1]. Then we argue
that the four properties in theorem 5 are satisfied as follows. Property (1) is satisfied
due to the fact that the Manhattan distance between nodes vi and vi+1 is exactly 1, for
i ∈ [1, |sj| − 1], since they are successive nodes on the Hamiltonian path. To prove the
feasibility of the second property, we specify v1 of each anonymity-set to be the endpoint of
the corresponding path segment that is closest to the root-node along the Hamiltonian path.
The property is satisfied because the root-node, v1,1, is at y = 1, the lowest y-coordinate.
For example, v1 becomes the root-node itself in the anonymity-set that contains the root-
node, wherein the y-coordinate of v1 is the lowest among other nodes in each anonymity-set,
and nodes {v2, v3, . . . , v|sj |} are located on the same row of v1 or below it. Since the length
of each row is
√
n, the number of rows that the anonymity-set spans is in Θ(d|s|/
√
ne),
which satisfies the third property. The fourth property is naturally satisfied because in
Algorithm 1, the remainder nodes are distributed over the anonymity-sets using one of the
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anonymity-sets construction methods namely, FSS, ES, or RS.
4.2.2 Query Routing
To query a desired (by the client) destination node vd in WSN anonymously using DAS
scheme, we need to route a query to every member of the anonymity-set sj to which
vd belongs. The proposed routing algorithm achieves this by building a routing substrate
based on the comb-like shortest-path spanning tree provided by the partitioning Algorithm
1. By launching a single query that visits all nodes of sj to which vd belongs, the query
responses of all the nodes are collected in a piggyback manner [9], where each node in the
anonymity-set attaches its response data with its ID to the query packet. This is possible
mainly because the nodes in DAS anonymity-sets are one hop from each other.
Besides the WSN graph G, and the queried node vd, one of the inputs to our Source-
Route Construction algorithm, listed in Algorithm 2, is the partition of G obtained using
the Partition algorithm, listed in Algorithm 1. As mentioned in section 4.2.1, the partition
consists of a family of disjoint anonymity-sets S = {si|i ∈ bn/kc}. Each anonymity-set
si ∈ S has its own first-node v1, and last-node v|si|.
We present an example of running the routing algorithm in Fig. 4.3. The proposed
Source-Route construction, namely Algorithm 2, is given as follows.
The output of Algorithm 2 is the list hj which contains the source-route header infor-
mation required by the DAS anonymity scheme. Each entry in hj consists of two elements:
the node ID value denoted by IDv, and the node action value denoted by Actionv. When a
query request is received, we first invoke FindAnonymitySet, in line 1, to find the the index
j ∈ [1, bn/kc] of the anonymity-set sj to which vd belongs. In FindAnonymitySet, line 10,
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Algorithm 2 Source-Route Construction




n connected undirected graph, vd ∈ V : the queried destination node, and S = {si|i ∈ [1, bn/kc]}:
the anonymity-sets obtained from running Algorithm 1
Output: hj : the source-route header information which is an ordered list of node IDs with their action values, and sj : the
corresponding anonymity-set of vd, where j ∈ [1, bn/kc]
1: j ← FindAnonymitySet(vd)
2: (x1, y1)← coordinates of v1 of sj /* The coordinates of first-node of the anonymity-set sj */
3: (x|sj |, y|sj |)← coordinates of v|sj | of sj /* The coordinates of last-node of the anonymity-set */
4: Initialize hj to an empty list
5: t← ConstructSpanningTree(G)
6: SourceRoutePart1(t, hj , x1, y1)
7: SourceRoutePart2(sj , hj)
8: SourceRoutePart3(t, hj , x|sj |, y|sj |)
9: return hj , sj
10: procedure FindAnonymitySet(v′)
11: for i← 1 to bn/kc do
12: if v′ ∈ si then





18: return t′ ← BFS(G′) starting at root-node v1,1 /* BFS is the Breadth First Search algorithm */





20: for i← 1 to y′1 − 1 do
21: AppendForwardingNode((1, i), h′j)
22: end for
23: for i← 1 to (x′1 − 1) do




26: procedure SourceRoutePart2(s′j , h
′
j)
27: foreach node v ∈ s′j do
28: IDv ← ID of node v
29: Actionv ← 1 /* piggyback action */
30: Append 〈IDv , Actionv〉 to h′j
31: end for





33: for i← x′|sj | − 1 to 1 do




36: for i← y′|sj | − 1 to 1 do
37: AppendForwardingNode((1, i), h′j)
38: end for
39: procedure AppendForwardingNode((x, y), h′′j )
40: IDv ← ID of the node corresponds to point (x, y) in the plane
41: Actionv ← 0 /* forward action */
42: Append 〈IDv , Actionv〉 to h′′j
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an iterator i is set up through all the anonymity-sets to check which one contains the queried
node, vd. In lines, 2 and 3, we specify x and y coordinates of the first-node as v1(x1, y1),
and the last-node as v|sj |(x|sj |, y|sj |), of the discovered anonymity-set sj. In line 4, we ini-
tialize hj, which contains the source-route header information, to an empty list. In line
5, we call the procedure ConstructSpanningTree on G to generate a comb-like shortest-
path spanning tree t, and then invoke the following three procedures: SourceRoutePart1,
SourceRoutePart2, SourceRoutePart3 in lines 6, 7, and 8 respectively, on t, and sj as
input arguments.
SourceRoutePart1 constructs the route to v1(x1, y1), which is the first-node of sj, by
traversing the comb-like shortest-path spanning tree t using two for loops. In the first
loop, line 20–22, we traverse the tree vertically by increasing the y coordinate along the
spine of the comb, i.e. x = 1 vertical line, starting from root-node v1,1, until reaching the
tooth of the comb with a y coordinate equal to (y1−1). In the second for loop, line 23–25,
we traverse the tree along the next tooth, i.e. the one with a y coordinate equal to y1,
horizontally by increasing the x coordinate till we hit v1. Each time through any of the
two for loops, we append a forwarding node entry to hj by invoking another procedure,
namely AppendForwardingNode in line 21 and 24, which specifies the two elements of the
appended node entry in hj as follows: ID of the node, and action value of 0, which denotes
a forward action only. Then we append the forwarding node entry.
In SourceRoutePart2 (line 26–31), we iterate through the nodes of the anonymity-set
sj. In each iteration of the foreah loop, we specify the two element of the appended node
entry as follows: the ID of the node, and the action value of 1, which denotes a respond
action in a piggyback manner. Then we append the node to hj.
In SourceRoutePart3, we construct the route from the last node of sj namely, v|sj | to
the root-node v1,1. To achieve this, we traverse t using two for loops. In the first loop, line
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33–35, we traverse t horizontally by decreasing the x coordinate, starting from x = x|sj |−1
till we reach the spine at x = 1. Then, in the second for loop on line 36–38, we traverse
t vertically by decreasing the y coordinates along the spine, starting from y|sj | − 1 till we
reach v1,1. Similar to SourceRoutePart1, in each iteration of any of the for loops, we
invoke AppendForwardingNode to append a forwarding nodes entry to hj after specifying
its two element: ID of the node, and action value of 0, which denotes a forward action
only.
Time Complexity: The Source-Route Construction algorithm, listed in Algorithm 2,
runs in time linear with the size of the square grid WSN, |V | = n. To see that, firstly we
observe that FindAnonymitySet takes at most O(bn/kc) = O(n). The assignments and
initialization, lines 2, 3, and 4, takes constant time, Θ(1). As we establish in section 4.2.1,
the running time of ConstructSpanningTree on a square grid graph is in O(|V |+ E||) =
O(n). Each of the two for loops of SourceRoutePart1 takes O(
√
n). This is so because the
first loop iterates along the spine of the comb-like spanning tree, and the second iterates
along one of its teeth, and both are in O(
√
n) as mentioned in section 4.2.1.
The same argument is valid for the running time of SourceRoutePart3 with the parts
of the comb-like tree along which the two for loops iterate are reversed. Therefore,
SourceRoutePart3 takes O(
√
n). Lastly, SourceRoutePart2 runs in time linear with the
size of the anonymity-set of the queried node vd, i.e. it is in Θ(|sj|). Since |sj| ∈ [k, 2k−1],
and k ∈ [1, n], thus SourceRoutePart3 takes time O(n) in the worst case. Therefore,
the total running time of the Source-Route Construction algorithm, listed in Algorithm 2,
which is equal the sum of time taken by FindAnonymitySet, ConstructSpanningTree,
SourceRoutePart1, SourceRoutePart2,and SourceRoutePart3 is O(n + n +
√
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Figure 4.3: An example of running the Source-Route Construction algorithm shown in
Algorithm 2 on a 4 × 4 square grid connected undirected graph shown on the far left,
and its procedures: FindAnonymitySet, ConstructSpanningTree, SourceRoutePart1,
SourceRoutePart2, and SourceRoutePart3. We use Algorithm 2 with an input value of
vd = 12, i.e. the ID of the queried node is 12, to construct the source-route required to
query the whole anonymity-set s4 = {11, 12, 16} to which vd belongs. The other input to
Algorithm 2 is the family of anonymity-sets that results from Algorithm 1, as shown on
the right of Fig. 4.1. First, we determine s4 as the anonymity-set of vd = 12 (the second
graph from left) using FindAnonymitySet procedure. For s4, v1 = 11, and v|sj | = 16.
Next, we construct, as in the third graph from left, a comb-like shortest path spanning
tree using BFS algorithm. Finally, we use SourceRoutePart1, SourceRoutePart2, and
SourceRoutePart3 to add node IDs to the source route header information h4 along with
their action values in the following order: 〈1, 0〉, 〈5, 0〉, 〈9, 0〉, 〈10, 0〉, 〈11, 1〉, 〈12, 1〉, 〈16, 1〉,
〈15, 0〉, 〈14, 0〉, 〈13, 0〉, 〈9, 0〉, 〈5, 0〉, 〈1, 0〉. Action value of 0 implies forward only, and 1
implies piggyback response data then forward. We adopt a stepwise construction of the
source-route in which the sequence of the steps of adding nodes to h4 is marked on Fig.
4.3 .
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4.2.3 The Querying Protocol
Our querying protocol, which implements the DAS anonymity scheme (π, T, T−1), defines
the rules for sending the client’s query to a desired destination node vd, and collecting
its response anonymously. The protocol involves the following parties: the client C, the
sensor-cloud S, and the WSN nodes V . C is the initiator of the protocol since she is the
party who decides when to send a new query, the event that starts the execution of the
protocol. Based on their action values in the header of the query packet, WSN nodes
either forward the query packet to the next hop in the source-route header information, or
piggyback their response data before forwarding.
In Protocol 1, we describe, in detail, how the parties engage in the querying protocol
by exchanging messages, and acting upon receiving them. An instance of executing the
querying protocol is depicted in Fig. 4.4. In the following, we identify some relevant
aspects of the protocol that comply with the requirements of our trust model as specified
in section 1.2.1.
Recall from section 1.2.1, in our trust-none model, the owner of the sensitive informa-
tion namely, the client C, trusts no other player in the anonymity scheme. In other words,
the model allows the adversary to be outsider or any one of the querying protocol players
except the owner of the sensitive information C. Moreover, the scheme remains secure
against the collusion of any of its outsider or insider adversaries. Consequently, in addition
to the partition algorithm π, all of the anonymity transformations (T , and T−1) are per-
formed exclusively at the client C. This is illustrated at the beginning of Protocol 1 where
Algorithm 2, which utilizes the Partition algorithm π, is used to find the anonymity-set sj
corresponds to the queried node vd, and construct the source-rote header information hj.
In essence, this means that the anonymity transformation T and the partition algorithm
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π are run entirely at C before even contacting the sensor-cloud S. Further, at the end of
Protocol 1, the inverse anonymity transformation T−1 is performed at C.
73
Protocol 1 The Querying Protocol
upon receiving a request from the client C to query a destination node vd:
Using Algorithm 2:
Find anonymity-set sj of vd
Generate corresponding source-route header information hj
Initialize R to an empty list of size |sj|
/* R stores piggybacked response data */
Create a query packet ρ:
Insert the client query data, and R into the payload of ρ
Insert hj into the header of ρ
Send ρ to the Sensor-Cloud S
upon receiving ρ by S from C:
Forward ρ to WSN through v1,1 (the root-node of WSN)
upon receiving ρ by an arbitrary WSN node v:
if v is not the first node entry in hj then
Drop ρ
else
Remove v’s entry 〈IDv, Actionv〉 from hj
if Actionv = 0 then
ρ← ρ with v’s entry removed from hj
Forward(ρ)
else if Actionv = 1 then
Append v’s response data di, i ∈ [1, n] to R in ρ




upon receiving ρ by S from v1,1:
Send back to C
upon receiving ρ by C from S:
Extract vd’s response data from R
Drop the rest of ρ
procedure Forward(ρ′)
if hj is empty then
Send back to S
else
Forward ρ′ to the next node in hj
end if
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Figure 4.4: An example of executing the querying protocol shown in Protocol 1 using a
4× 4 square grid connected undirected graph. The action field is 1 for the anonymity-set
members so they attach their response data R to the packet in a piggy-back manner. First,
the protocol uses Algorithm 2 to find the anonymity-set s3 = {5, 9, 10} of the queried node
vd = 9, as shown on the right of Fig. 4.1. Using the same algorithm, it creates the required
source-route header information h3 = 〈1, 0〉, 〈5, 1〉, 〈9, 1〉, 〈10, 1〉, 〈9, 0〉, 〈5, 0〉, 〈1, 0〉. Then,
it inserts h3 along with the piggyback response data structure R, which is of size equal to
|s3| = 3, and the query data into the query packet. The upper part of the figure shows
the path taken by the query packet, which starts and ends at the client, in order to collect
responses from all nodes in s3 as required by the DAS anonymity scheme. The lower part
of the figure tracks down the changes in the query packet header, specifically in h3, and
the piggyback response data collection. At the end, the client keeps d9, the response data
of the queried node vd = 9, and drops the rest of the packet.
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Chapter 5
Cost Analysis of Secure
K-Anonymous Query Schemes
It is important to know how much communication-cost is needed, on average and in the
worst-case, to guarantee that the desired level-of-anonymity k is achieved using a secure
k-anonymous query scheme such as DAS (see Chapter 4). In this chapter, we analyze the
trade-off between incurred communication-cost and offered query-anonymity in a square
grid WSN that is the main issue in communication-based class of anonymous communica-
tion schemes (see section 2.2).
Since DAS facilitates the measurement of query-anonymity by having the level-of-
anonymity equal to the minimum size of anonymity-sets, i.e. k = min
s∈S
|s|, which is es-
tablished in Theorem 4, we will be presenting, in the rest of this chapter, a model to mea-




Assume the query and response data are of a constant and uniform size, and the cost of
sending this constant amount of data over one hop is constant as well, i.e. Θ(1). We
consider a square grid homogeneous WSN of size n nodes. The position of each node is
defined by the ordered pair of its Cartesian coordinates (i, j), where i, j ∈ [1,
√
n]. In our
setting, the client communicates directly with root node at (1, 1), namely v1,1. A route
of the shortest Manhattan distance from the root node v1,1 to each destination node is
predefined. Manhattan distance between two nodes is equal to the sum of the absolute
differences of their Cartesian coordinates [88]. By modeling a square grid WSN as a
connected undirected graph, the Manhattan distance corresponding to the longest shortest
path between any pair of nodes is equal to 2(
√
n−1). It is called the diameter of the graph,
which we denote by d. The lemmas below facilitate the calculation of communication-cost
along the three parts of the routing path which are discussed in section 4.2.2.
Lemma 2. The communication-cost (c) of transmitting a packet of a constant size data
along a source-routing path of length (l) in G = (V,E) is asymptotically quadratic with
respect to the path’s length. That is, c = Θ(l2).
Proof. Assume source routing is implemented where the path for each packet is kept in the
packet header. Obviously, the initial length of the source-route entries record (number of
nodes) in the packet header is l + 1, where l is the path length from source to destination
node. We add 1 to count for the source node. Since the path length shrinks to one entry at
the final destination, we can asymptotically abstract the incurred communication-cost from
transmitting such a packet as: c = Θ(l+1)+Θ(l)+ · · ·+Θ(1) = Θ(l)+ · · ·+Θ(l) = Θ(l2).
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Lemma 3. Assume the response data of each node in the anonymity-set is of a constant
size Θ(1), the communication-cost c of collecting responses from all nodes in the anonymity-
set of a secure k-anonymous query scheme is asymptotically quadratic with respect to the
offered level-of-anonymity k. That is, c = Θ(k2).
Proof. With the fact that transmission over one hop incurs a constant communication-
cost Θ(1), the communication-cost is incremented by Θ(1) over every next hop in the
anonymity-set. Hence, the total communication-cost of the piggyback is:Θ(|s|) + Θ(|s| −
1) + · · ·+ Θ(1) = Θ(k) + Θ(k− 1) + · · ·+ Θ(1) = Θ(k) + Θ(k) + · · ·+ Θ(k) = Θ(k2). The
last equality uses the results we have established in Corollary 2 namely, |s| = Θ(k) in the
secure k-anonymous query scheme.
5.2 Average and Worst-Case Analysis
In this section, we present our asymptotic analysis for the trade-off between query-anonymity
and incurred communication-cost in the source-routed square grid WSN. We show that the
diameter of the graph, d, which is the longest shortest path between any pair of nodes,
plays the role of an inflection point. At this inflection point, the necessary and sufficient
communication-cost changes from asymptotic dependence on d2, to quadratic asymptotic
dependence on the offered level-of-anonymity, k2. The basic intuition behind that is the
communication-cost can be expressed asymptotically in terms of the sum of d2 and k2.
Thus, when k is much less than d, i.e. k ∈ [1,Θ(d)], the cost grows asymptotically with
d2, and vice versa.
78
We present our theoretical results for the average and worst-case cost analysis of the
trade-off in the following asymptotic assertions.
5.2.1 Average-Case Analysis
Theorem 6. To achieve secure query k − anonymity of k ∈ [1,Θ(d)] in a source-routed
square grid WSN of size n whose diameter is d, an average-case cost of ca = O(d
2) is
sufficient, and ca = Ω(d
2) is necessary.
Proof. Sufficiency: Recall that the proposed construction, which is presented in Chapter
4, is a provably secure k-anonymous query scheme by Theorem 3. Therefore, In order to
prove this part, it is enough to show that an average cost of ca = O(d
2) is sufficient for
it to achieve a level-of-anonymity of k ∈ [1,Θ(d)]. Let Vd be the random variable whose
value equals the destination node vd that is queried by the client. In fact, we have no
idea about how the client selects vd, nor do we have any control over the selection process.
Consequently, it is natural to assume that all WSN nodes v1, . . . , vn are equally likely to be
a destination node vd of the client query. Thus, we have Pr[Vd = vdi] = 1/n, where vdi ∈ V
is an arbitrary node in WSN, and i ∈ [1, n]. To this end, we calculate the average-case cost
ca by applying the definition of the expected value [92], ca =
∑n
i=1 ci Pr[Vd = vdi] Where
ci denotes the total communication-cost of querying an arbitrary node vdi, and collecting
its response anonymously. It comprises both the query and response routing cost and
piggyback data collection cost.
It remains to prove that ci = O(d
2). First, we consider that the client seeks to query an
arbitrary node of WSN vdi which belongs to an anonymity-set sj anonymously. To bound
the incurred communication-cost from above, we examine the path from the client to the
anonymity-set sj via the sensor-cloud. As specified in section 4.2.2, our routing path to vdi
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is split into three parts. We claim that the total length of the three parts of the constructed
route is in O(d). It is so because each of the first and third parts are the shortest paths
between two nodes namely, v1,1,v1, and v1,1, v|sj | correspondingly, where v1, and v|sj | are
the first-node and the last-node of sj respectively. Nonetheless, the diameter of the graph,
d, is the longest shortest path between any pair of nodes. Thus, the first and third parts
are in O(d). For the second part, its path length is equal to the size of the anonymity-set,
|sj|, |sj| is in Θ(k) by Corollary 2, and k ∈ [1,Θ(d)] by assumption. Thus, the total length
of the query and response routing path is in O(d). By Lemma 2, we conclude that the
incurred routing cost from the three parts together is in O(d2). Similarly, the piggyback
data collection cost is in O(d2), since it is in Θ(k2) by Lemma 3, and k ∈ [1,Θ(d)] by
assumption. At last, the collected data of size |sj| = Θ(k) is forwarded along the third
part of the route, which is of length O(d), back to the client. This incurs a worst-case cost
of O(k d), but since k ∈ [1,Θ(d)], the incurred worst-case cost is in O(d2). Consequently,
total communication-cost which is the sum of routing and data collection cost is in O(d2).
Now we can compute the average-case cost as, ca =
∑n
i=1 ci Pr[Vd = vdi] = n O(d
2) 1/n =
O(d2).
Necessity: we prove by contradiction. Assume otherwise that there exists a secure
k-anonymous query scheme that achieves a level-of-anonymity k ∈ [1,Θ(d)], and requires
a communication-cost of o(d2) in the average-case (note that o(d2) is the complement of
Ω(d2)). To bound the necessary average cost of such a scheme from below, we compute the
cost of the least amount of data, 1 bit, that is sent to each node of WSN and back. This
refers to the case where no anonymity is offered, i.e. k = 1. The total cost therefor is merely
the routing cost. Then we average across all nodes of WSN. As in the proof of the sufficiency
part, we apply the definition of the expected value [92] namely, ca =
∑n
i=1 ci Pr[Vd = vdi],
where Pr[Vd = vdi] = 1/n as discussed in the sufficiency part of this theorem, and ci denotes
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the communication-cost of sending 1 bit to node vdi. We argue that ci = Ω(d
2). The reason
is that the Manhattan distance values from root-node to WSN nodes are d, d−1, d−2, . . . ,
and so on. By choosing suitable positive constant values, it is easy to show that these
distances are in Ω(d). Thus, By Lemma 2, we conclude that the incurred communication-
cost is in Ω(d2). Plugging in theses values into the expected value definition, the result
follows. That is, ca =
∑n
i=1 ci Pr[Vd = vdi] = n Ω(d
2) 1/n = Ω(d2), which gives us the
desired contradiction.
Theorem 7. To achieve secure query k − anonymity of k ∈ [Θ(d), n] in a source-routed
square grid WSN of size n whose diameter is d, an average-case cost of ca = O(k
2) is
sufficient, and ca = Ω(k
2) is necessary.
Proof. Sufficiency: We carry out the proof of this part similar to the sufficiency proof of
Theorem 6. As an example of secure k-anonymous query schemes, we analyze the cost
required by the proposed construction ( see Chapter 4) to achieve a level-of-anonymity of
k ∈ [Θ(d), n]. To compute the sufficient average cost, we use the definition of the expected
value [92], ca =
∑n
i=1 ci Pr[Vd = vdi], where, Pr[Vd = vdi] = 1/n as discussed in Theorem
6, and ci denotes the total communication-cost of querying an arbitrary node vdi, and
collecting its response anonymously. It incorporates both the routing cost and piggyback
data collection cost. To find ci, we pursue the same logic of the corresponding sufficiency
proof of Theorem 6. Thus, we consider the destination node of the client anonymous query
to be an arbitrary node of WSN, vdi. Recall that our routing path is split into three parts,
as in section 4.2.2. The path length of the first and third parts of the route is in O(k) since
each part is in O(d), and k ∈ [Θ(d), n] by assumption. Therefore, the length of the three
parts of the route is in O(k) since the length of the second part is equal to |sj| which is
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in Θ(k) from Corollary 2. By Lemma 2, the routing cost is in O(k2). The data collection
is in O(k2) as we establish in Lemma 3. Additionally, the collected data of size O(k)
incurs a cost of O(k2) when it travels back to the client via sensor-cloud along the third
part of the route, which is of length O(d). This is because k ∈ [Θ(d), n] by assumption,
and the incurred cost is in O(k d). Consequently, the total communication-cost of an
arbitrary node in WSN ci ∈ O(k2). Now we are able to compute the average cost to be,
ca =
∑n
i=1 ci Pr[Vd = vdi] = n O(k
2) 1/n = O(k2).
Necessity: For the purpose of contradiction, suppose there exists a secure k-anonymous
query scheme that achieves a level-of-anonymity k ∈ [Θ(d), n], and requires a communication-
cost of o(k2) in the average-case. To analyze its necessary cost in the average-case,
we adopt the definition of the expected value [92], ca =
∑n
i=1 ci Pr[Vd = vdi], where,
Pr[Vd = vdi] = 1/n as discussed in Theorem 6, and ci denotes the necessary communication-
cost required by this hypothesized scheme to query an arbitrary node vdi ∈ V , and collect-
ing its response anonymously. To achieve this, the scheme must be able to query all nodes
of the anonymity-set sj to which vdi belongs. It is clear that ci is bounded from below by
the cost of sending a minimum of 1 bit to all |sj| nodes of the anonymity-set to which vdi
belongs. Hence, The source route length must be at least equal to |sj|. By Lemma 2, The
cost of this communications is in Ω(|sj|2). Therefore, the necessary communication-cost ci
is in Ω(k2) using the result from corollary 2. Now we are able to compute the necessary
average cost to be, ca =
∑n
i=1 ci Pr[Vd = vdi] = n Ω(k




Theorem 8. To achieve secure query k − anonymity of k ∈ [1,Θ(d)] in a source-routed
square grid WSN of size n whose diameter is d, a worst-case cost of cw = O(d
2) is sufficient,
and cw = Ω(d
2) is necessary.
Proof. Sufficiency: recall that DAS is a provably secure k-anonymous query scheme, as we
establish in Theorem 4. Thus, to prove the sufficiency, it is enough to show that a worst-
case communication-cost of O(d2) is sufficient for DAS to achieve a level-of-anonymity of
k ∈ [1,Θ(d)]. First, we observe that the worst-case cost is incurred when the client seeks
to query the farthest node from it, which is v√n,√n, anonymously. That is, the destination
node vd = v√n,√n. To bound this communication-cost from above, we consider the path
from the client to the anonymity-set sj, to which vd belongs, and back to the client via the
cloud. Our routing algorithm splits the route to vd into three parts, as in section 4.2.2.
Intuitively, the total incurred communication-cost is equal to the sum of query and response
routing cost along these three parts of the route, plus the data collection piggyback cost.
We claim that this total communication-cost is at worst in O(d2).
To see why, first recall from section 4.2.2 that our routing algorithm relies on the first-





first part routes the query from root-node v1,1 to v1. Since the diameter of the graph d
is the longest shortest path between any pair of nodes, the length of the first part of the
route is in O(d). Similar argument is valid for the third part which routes the piggybacked
responses from v|sj | to v1,1. Thus, the length of the third part is in O(d). Additionally, the
length of the second part is also in O(d). To reason about that, recall that the length of
this part is equal to the size of the anonymity-set |sj| to which the node v√n,√n belongs. In
DAS, we have |s| ∈ [k, 2k−1]. Thus, |s| = Θ(k), and by assumption we have k ∈ [1,Θ(d)],
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hence the result follows. Now, since the length each of theses three parts is in O(d), the
sum of them is also in O(d). By lemmas 2, the first, second, and third parts incur a
worst-case routing cost of O(d2).
Next, we shall examine the piggyback cost. The second part of the route is used
to collect responses from all nodes in the anonymity-set sj in a piggyback manner. By
lemma 3, the incurred communication-cost from this part is in Θ(k2). But, by assumption,
k ∈ [1,Θ(d)], thus the worst-case data collection cost is also in O(d2). This collected data
of sizeO(k) is forwarded along the third part of the route, whose length is in O(d), back
to the client. This incurs a worst-case cost of O(kd). Since k ∈ [1,Θ(d)], the incurred
worst-case cost is in O(d2). Consequently, The total communication-cost is at worst:
cw = O(d
2) +O(d2) +O(d2) = O(d2).
Necessity: assume otherwise for the purpose of contradiction. That is, there exists a
secure k-anonymous query scheme that achieves a level-of-anonymity k ∈ [1,Θ(d)], and
requires a communication-cost of o(d2) in the worst case. We observe that the worst-
case communication-cost is incurred when the client seeks to query v√n,√n, the farthest
node from it. Thus, its worst-case communication-cost is bounded from below by the
communication-cost of sending at least 1 bit to node v√n,√n and back to the client via
cloud. This cost represents the least communication-cost that is needed by any anonymity
scheme to perform its goal since it is the minimum cost needed to communicate with node
v√n,√n without offering any anonymity, i.e. k = 1. It is easy to see that this communication-
cost is in Ω(d2). First, consider the Manhattan distance from the root-node v1,1 to v√n,√n
and back. The distance on each direction is linear in the diameter of the graph d. Then
the result, which is cw = Ω(d
2), follows from lemma 2.
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Theorem 9. To achieve secure query k − anonymity of k ∈ [Θ(d), n] in a source-routed
square grid WSN of size n whose diameter is d, a worst-case cost of cw = O(k
2) is sufficient,
and cw = Ω(k
2) is necessary.
Proof. Sufficiency: we prove this part by construction. That is, we provide a secure k-
anonymous query scheme, which is DAS, and show that a worst-case cost of O(k2) is
sufficient to achieve a level-of-anonymity of k ∈ [Θ(d), n]. As in the proof of Theorem 8,
we drive the worst-case communication-cost by setting the destination node vd = v√n,√n
in our routing algorithm, i.e. Algorithm 2. To articulate an upper bound for the routing
cost, we consider the three parts of the route to sj, which is the anonymity-set to which
vd = v√n,√n belongs. The first and third are shortest paths between two points in the
graph. Therefore, each of them is in O(d). Now by assumption, we have k ∈ [Θ(d), n].
That is k ≥ Θ(d). Thus each of the first and second path length is in O(k). It is easy to see
that the length of the second part is also in O(k) since it is equal to |sj|, which is in Θ(k)
for DAS. As a consequence, the length of the three parts is in O(k). Thus the the routing
cost is at worst in O(k2) by By lemmas 2. Likewise, the data collection piggyback cost is
in O(k2) by lemma 3. Furthermore, the collected data of size O(k) is forwarded along the
third part of the route, which is of length O(d), back to the client. This incurs a worst-case
cost of O(kd), but since k ∈ [Θ(d), n] by assumption, hence the incurred worst-case cost
is in O(k2). Therefore, the total communication-cost, which is the sum of the routing and
data collection cost, is in O(k2).
Necessity: For the purpose of contradiction, assume that there exists a secure k-
anonymous query scheme that achieves a level-of-anonymity k ∈ [Θ(d), n], and requires
a communication-cost of o(k2) in the worst case. However, such a scheme must be able
to query and collect a response from the worst-case destination node vd = v√n,√n anony-
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mously. As mentioned in Chapter 4, this entails that the scheme must be able to query
and collect responses from all nodes in the anonymity-set sj to which the destination node
vd = v√n,√n belongs. Consequently, the source route must include at least |sj| nodes, and
at least 1 bit must be sent to each one of them. By Lemma 2, The cost of this com-
munications is in Θ(|sj|2). Hence, the scheme incurs a necessary communication-cost of
Ω(|sj|2). We obtain easily a desired contradiction by applying corollary 2 which yields that
the necessary communication-cost is in Ω(k2).
5.3 Query Path Length
The proceeding analysis deals with the trade-off between query-anonymity and commu-
nication overhead cost which is the main focus of our work. Another useful result we
establish in Theorem 10 related to the asymptotic bounds on query and response path
length. Its importance stems from the fact that it is an indicative of the propagation
time delay caused by an anonymity scheme in order to achieve various values of level-of-
anonymity k. In Chapter 6, we use the path length as a performance index to compare
different configurations of the secure k-anonymous query scheme.
Theorem 10. To achieve secure query k-anonymity of k ∈ [1,Θ(d)] in a source-routed
square grid WSN of size n whose diameter is d, the query and response path length measured
in number of hops is in O(d) in the average-case and worst-case, and to achieve k ∈
[Θ(d), n], the path length is in O(k) in the average-case and worst-case.
Proof. The proof is straightforward once we recall that the hops along each query and
response path of a secure k-anonymous query scheme are of two types namely, the routing-
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hops, and the collection-hops. The routing-hops are used to forward the query to the firs-
node of the anonymity-set, and to collect the responses from the last-node of it. Therefore,
the routing-hops are in O(d). On the other hand, the collection hops are the anonymity-set
nodes whose responses are collected. Thus, the collection-hops are in O(k) because the
anonymity-set size is in O(k) by corollary 2. Now, when d is relatively large compared to
k, i.e. k ∈ [1,Θ(d)], the routing-hops dominates the collection-hops so that the whole path
length is in O(d), and vice versa. That is for k ∈ [Θ(d), n], the collection-hops dominates





The proposed secure k-anonymous query scheme, DAS, was examined via extensive simu-
lation. We ensure all the targeted variables, such as average-case, and worst-case cost, path
length, and location-anonymity, are systematically measured with respect to the level-of-
anonymity k, WSN network size n, and diameter d. We implemented all of our algorithms
and querying protocol in a large-scale network environment on a dedicated 2.6 GHz Intel
Core i7 x86 64 bit machine running OS X 10.11.6 El Capitan. In essence, we measured
the following:
• How the anonymity scheme performance changes with the level-of-anonymity k for
various values of WSN network diameter d, and
• How the anonymity scheme performance changes with WSN network diameter d for
various values of level-of-anonymity k.
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The query packet is structured as follows: 1 byte for the client ID, 10 bytes for MAC
header, 1 byte for the action taken by each node to be either froward or append response
then forward, 2 bytes for the node IDs. Each query data and response data is modeled
to be constant at 32 bytes. To evaluate energy consumption, we adopt the MEMSIC
TelosB mote platform [8] where each node is composed of a TI MPS 430 microcontroller
and CC2420 RF transceiver that consumes 1.8 microjoule per byte for reception and 2.1
microjoule per byte for transmission.
In section 6.1, we introduce our cost-benefit metric ROI, and location-anonymity met-
rics r and dmax that prove to be beneficial in our various performance-anonymity trade-offs
analysis presented in section 6.2.
6.1 Performance Metrics
In addition to various performance anonymity trade-offs, we are interested in measuring
the offered level-of-anonymity k (the benefit) relative to the communication-cost c (cost) of
implementing the proposed scheme, as well as evaluating the achieved location-anonymity.
For the cost-benefit analysis, the metric of Return-On-Investment (ROI) is introduced,
where ROI = k
c
. In essence, ROI measures the return on investment relative to the cost
of investment. ROI is taken for both the average and worst-case communication-cost
evaluation.
For the location-anonymity, two formal metrics are adopted to measure the average
and maximum achieved anonymity. The first metric is the radius of cloaking area of a
specific level-of-anonymity k that is modelled as an equivalent circular area. Note that
the cloaking area is the amount of space within which the true destination of a query is
not identifiable due to the existence of its anonymity-set members, whereas the cloaking
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distance of a node, denoted as dc, is the distance between it and any another node in its
anonymity-set [93]. The radius r measures the average cloaking distance of the centroid
node over all anonymity-sets. Note that the centroid node of the anonymity-set sj is the
node vi with the minimum sum of cloaking distances Sumidc to all other nodes in sj, i.e.,
minvi∈sj(Sumidc). Thus, we compute the radius r as the minimum value of the average of






), i ∈ [1, |sj|], j ∈ [1, bn/kc]
Now, we show how to obtain the second metric, i.e. the maximum cloaking distance
dmax. We first find the maximum cloaking distance dmaxi for each node vi in an anonymity-
set sj for a certain level-of-anonymity k. Since each node in the anonymity-set is a possible
true destination, then we apply the concept of weakest link to select the minimum of the
found maximum cloaking distances for each anonymity-set [83]. Eventually, we choose the
weakest link again by taking the minimum over all of the anonymity-sets which results in





(dmaxi)), i ∈ [1, |sj|], j ∈ [1, bn/kc]
We specify in Algorithm 4 how to compute r and dmax. In addition, a simplified example
in which k = n = 9, i.e. for a single anonymity-set case, is shown pictorially in Fig. 6.1.
We are interested in studying the limiting behavior of location-anonymity that is offered
by a secure k-anonymous query scheme such as DAS. In Theorem 11 below, we derive
asymptotic upper-bounds on dmax, and r.
Theorem 11. Given a connected undirected graph G = (V,E) of n vertices whose diameter
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Algorithm 4 The Location-Anonymity Metrics Algorithm




n square grid connected undirected graph G = (V,E) into
disjoint anonymity-sets S for a desired level-of-anonymity k.
Output: r, and dmax location-anonymity metric.
1: n← |V |
2: Initialize each of D,M,M ′, A and A′ to an empty list
3: foreach anonymity-set s ∈ S do
4: foreach node v ∈ s do
5: s′ ← s after node v is removed
6: foreach node v′ ∈ s′ do
7: Append the distance from v to v′ to D /* D stores the cloaking distances of
node v. */
8: end for
9: Append Max(D) to M
10: Append Sum(D) to A
11: end for
12: Append Min(M) to M ′
13: Append Min(A)/(k − 1) to A′
14: end for
15: dmax ←Min(M ′)
16: r ←Min(A′)
17: return r, dmax
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is d, both of the location-anonymity metrics dmax and r are in O(d) for DAS secure k-
anonymous query scheme that achieves a level-of-anonymity k ∈ [Θ(d), n], and in O(k) for
secure k-anonymous query scheme that achieves a level-of-anonymity k ∈ [1,Θ(d)].
Proof. The key to the proof is to note that the each of the cloaking distances of a node
in an anonymity-set may not exceed O(k) and O(d). To see why, we reason as follows.
The anonymity-set size is |s| ∈ [k, 2k − 2], thus we have |s| ∈ O(k) which is consistent
with Corollary 2. Recall that we measure the distance, including the cloaking distance dc,
between two nodes as the length of the shortest path connecting them. Since the nodes in
the DAS anonymity-set are adjacent then we have dc ∈ O(k). dc is also in O(d) because d
is the longest shortest path between any pair of nodes by definition. To have a tight bound
on dc, for relatively large k compared to d, i.e. k ∈ [Θ(d), n], we bound dc from above by
O(d), and vice versa. That is, for relatively large d compared to k, i.e. k ∈ [1,Θ(d)], we
bound dc from above by O(k). Now, since dmax is one of the cloaking distances, and r acts
as an average of the cloaking distances then the desired result holds.
Now, since the square grid is a connected undirected graph, the assertion established in
Theorem 11 is applicable to it. In section 6.2, we conduct an exact experimental analysis


















Figure 6.1: A simplified example of creating the equivalent circular cloaking area, and
computing its radius r for the case of single anonymity-set, i.e. k = n = 9. We have the
sum of cloaking distances for each node as follows: Sum1dc = 1+2+1+2+3+2+3+4 = 18,
Sum2dc = 15, Sum3dc = 18, Sum4dc = 15, Sum5dc = 12, Sum6dc=15, Sum7dc=18,
Sum8dc = 15, Sum9dc = 18. We conclude that node 5 is the centroid of the cloaking area
since it has the minimum sum of cloaking distance. Now, we compute the average cloaking
distance of node 5, the centroid to be 12/(9 − 1) = 1.5. It is only one value in this case
since we have a single anonymity-set. Thus, there is no need to do the last step namely,
selecting the minimum average of cloaking distances of centroids over all anonymity-sets.
In terms of dmax calculation for the same example, the maximum clocking distances of
each node in the anonymity-set are as follows:dmax1=4, dmax2=3, dmax3=4, dmax4=3, dmax5=2,
dmax6=3, dmax7=4, dmax8=3, dmax9=4. Thus, the lowest value is 2 which belongs to node 5.
This is also the final value of dmax since we have a single anonymity-set.
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6.2 Evaluation Results
The main goal of our experiments was to validate our asymptotic analysis presented in
section 5.2. The crucial observation we can make is that our exact average and worst-cost
analysis of the achieved query-anonymity reasserts our asymptotic bounds for large scale
of WSN network size and simulation settings.
Our asymptotic cost analysis, presented in section 5.2, indicated that the behavior of
the secure k-anonymous query scheme is shaped by two main variables, namely the level-
of-anonymity k and the network diameter d that is further a function of WSN size n. Thus
two sets of experiments are conducted as in the following sections in order to measure the
performance of the anonymity scheme after changing one of these variables separately. Due
to the large size of data that we collected, we will be discussing below typical representative
results and performance trends.
6.2.1 Level-of-Anonymity k Impact
Average and Worst-Case Communication-Cost
We first measured the average communication-cost ca incurred by DAS to achieve various
level-of anonymity k ∈ [1, n] based on a specific anonymity-set construction method FSS,
ES, or RS, respectively. Since the network diameter d of a square grid graph is equal to
2(
√
n − 1), changing n implies change of d. For more reliable results, our experiment is
repeated in several WSN networks of sizes up to n = 10000, that is of diameter up to 198.
In addition, we averaged the RS results over 100 random runs. We depict the obtained
























































Figure 6.2: The average communication-cost with varying k.
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It is observed that there exists a value of k ∈ Θ(d), which we call k0 = c0d, after which
the average communication-cost ca is bounded from above and below by O(k
2), and Ω(k2)
respectively, as stated in Theorem 7. The upper bound UB and the lower bound LB serve
as sufficiency and necessary conditions in Theorem 7, respectively. These bounds provide
a sound empirical evidence in support of our asymptotic analysis.
In the second column of Table 6.1, we summarize the estimated values of the constants
for each of the above asymptotic relationships.
Compared to DC-Net which occurs when k = n (i.e. k = 4900 or k = 10000), DAS pro-
vided a more flexible range of levels-of-anonymity with lower average-case communication-
cost. Indeed the incurred communication by DC-Net scheme was so high (1.6 × 109 mi-
crojoule for n = 4900, and 7 × 109 microjoule for n = 10000) that we did not include
in Fig. 6.2 to be able to compare the little differences among different anonymity-sets
construction methods. In terms of comparing the different anonymity-sets construction
methods, we observed that they are close to each other with respect to their incurred av-
erage communication-cost to achieve various values of k. It is expected that the FSS takes
less energy because it tends to have the whole remainder in the first set close to the root
node eliminating the first and third part of the source-route, as described in Algorithm 2.
However, it was quiet surprising that FSS was outperformed consistently by the ES and
RS at some points. These points occur when the remainder of n/k is at its local maximum
value. A reason for that must be related to the way that the piggy-back strategy collects
sensor readings which incurs a cost that grows with the remainder of n/k. Additionally,
the differences in energy consumption become less evident as the remainder approaches
zero. This is what gives the curves their stair-like shapes.
Fig. 6.3 shows the results of worst-case communication cost. Similar to that of the
average-case above, the worst-case cost is bounded by k2 after some value of k ∈ Θ(d),
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namely k0 = c0d as establish in Theorem 9. For better comparison, we used the same
set of k values for all of our tests in this section. Intuitively, the estimated value of the
upper bound asymptotic constant c2 is significantly higher than that of the average-case
since we are changing k along the same range of values. Interestingly enough, c0 = 1 is the
same value as that of the average-case. This highlights the fact that k0 = c0d = d is the
inflection point above which, i.e. k ∈ [d, n] or k  d, the quadratic term that dominates
the asymptotic behavior of the average and worst-case cost is k2. We list these findings in
Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Values of Asymptotic Constants when k  d
Asymptotic constant Average-case analysis Worst-case analysis





Compared to DC-Net which occurs when k = n (i.e. k = 4900 or k = 10000), DAS
provided a more flexible range of levels-of-anonymity with lower worst-case communication-
cost. Again, the incurred communication by DC-Net scheme was so high (1.6× 109 micro-
joule for n = 4900, and 7× 109 microjoule for n = 10000) that we did not include in Fig.
6.2 to be able to compare the little differences among different anonymity-sets construc-
tion methods. Similar observations are gained as that of the average-case above where the
worst-case cost of FSS was the highest, the Random-Spread performs in between the FSS
























































Figure 6.3: The worst-case communication-cost with varying k .
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Cost-Benefit Analysis
There is something specific and enriching that we discover by looking into the curves and
data traces of ROI for variable level-of-anonymity k as shown in Fig. 6.4, and 6.5. The
ROI curves were shaped like a bell around the inflection point k0 = d for both the average
and worst-case cost, and all the anonymity-sets construction methods. That is, the ROI
increased with k till the inflection point k0 = d after which it decreased significantly with k.
From practical viewpoint, this indicates that the ROI relative to the cost is at its highest
values around the inflection point k0 = d.
We argue as follows. First recall from the asymptotic analysis, which is presented in
section 5.2, that the communication-cost c consists of two main components, one grows in
proportion to k2 and the other is in d2. The first component increases with the anonymity-
set size |s| since |s| ∈ [k, 2k − 1]. On the other hand, the second is due to the cost of
forwarding a query to the first-node of anonymity-set, and returning collected responses
from the last-node of the anonymity-set. Since we fixed the network size n during this part
of the experiment, the length of the forward and return paths shrinks with every increment
in k. It follows that this component decreases with k. Now, for the range of k < k0, The
increment in the first component is marginal and balanced by the decrease in the second
leaving the communication-cost almost constant. Thus, ROI = k/c increases with k for
k < k0. Nevertheless, when k exceeds the inflection point k0 = d, the first component
k2 dominates the second which results in a substantial decrease in ROI as the value of k
grows.
Compared to DC-Net which occurs when k = n (i.e. k = 4900 or k = 10000), DAS
provided better ROI in most of the cases because of the high incurred communication-cost
of DC-Net whose ROI was fixed at 1.4× 10−6 and 2.9× 10−6 for n = 10000 and n = 4900
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respectively in the average and worst-case.
By comparing the ROI data traces of different anonymity-sets construction method,
we made comparable observations to that of the average and worst-case analysis mentioned
in the proceeding paragraphs. That is, the values of the ROI under the three methods
were close to each other. However, the ROI of FSS was the lowest in most of the time as
k increased due to the growing size of the first anonymity-set. This becomes more evident
when the worst-case cost is used to compute the ROI as shown in Fig. 6.5. Additionally,





























































































Furthermore, we found that the total number of hops along the query and response path
are in O(k) for k > d for both the average and worst-case, as shown in Fig. 6.6 and
6.7, regarding various n and anonymity-sets construction methods. This confirms our
theoretical assertions in Theorem 10.
As expected, DC-Net which occurs when k = n (i.e. k = 4900 or k = 10000) produced
longer path length (4969 for n = 4900, and 10099 for n = 10000) in the average and worst-
case than DAS. The path length is further used as an index to compare the performance of
the different anonymity-sets construction methods. We observed that all of them performed
similarly in the average-case, which follows our intuition since the different anonymity-sets
construction methods spread the same total number of hops in various ways. Thus, they
produced comparable total number of traversed hops to query all the anonymity-sets and
collect their responses. Nevertheless, the worst-case path length generated by the FSS is
found longer than that by ES and RS whenever there is a remainder out of n/k. To see
why, recall that the hops along the query and response path are of two types: routing-
hops which increase with d, and collection-hops which increase with k. Now since the ES
attempts to distribute the remaining nodes out of n/k equally on all of the anonymity-sets,
the worst-case collection hops grows steadily with k. On the contrary, the FSS adds all the
remaining nodes to the first set. Thus, the worst-case number of hops occurs at the first
set because it has the maximum number of collection hops. Since d was fixed during this
set of experiments, the collection hops dominated the routing hops when k grows larger
than d. This resulted in that the worst-case path length of FSS surpassed that of the ES
whenever there is a remainder. On the other hand, RS acted closely to the ES because it
disseminates the remaining nodes out of n/k randomly on the anonymity-sets which makes
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Figure 6.7: The worst-case number of hops with varying k .
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Location Anonymity
We now evaluate the achieved location-anonymity by DAS anonymity scheme using the
maximum cloaking distance dmax, and the radius of cloaking area r metrics that are dis-
cussed in section 6.1. As expected, we observed that both the dmax and r grew with k
because of the increase in the size of the anonymity-set. When k is relatively large com-
pared to d, the upper bound of dmax and r is in O(d) which confirms our analysis in
Theorem 11. Specifically, both dmax and r values are less than d. We depict our results
for various network size n in Fig. 6.8, and 6.9.





represents the maximum offered location-anonymity by any scheme, however the incurred
communication-cost was also the highest. By analyzing the location-anonymity metrics
data which is shown in Fig.s 6.8, and 6.9, we also noted that the ES achieved better location-
anonymity compared to FSS whenever there is a remainder out of n/k. Nonetheless,
RS stayed between them in most cases. To reason about it, recall that ES attempts to
distribute the remainder equally on all the anonymity-sets while FSS adds all the remaining
nodes out of n/k to the first anonymity-set. Thus, the anonymity-sets created by FSS are
all of the smallest size which is k except for the first set. On the other hand, when the
remainder of n/k is greater or equal to n/k, ES yields anonymity-sets all of a size greater
than k. Now, both of dmax and r adopts the security weakest link concept as discussed
in section 6.1 which always selects the anonymity-set with the minimum size to calculate
these metrics. Hence, ES is in advantage by having the minimum size of the anonymity-
sets greater than that of the FSS when there is a large enough remainder of n/k. In this
way, the metrics of ES become higher than that of FSS as an indicative of better offered
location-anonymity. Lastly, because of the randomness of RS, it acts between the two
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extremes.
As stated in section 6.1, whereas dmax measures the location-anonymity that is offered
by the anonymity scheme, r acts as a benefit-cost measure. In r, the benefit is sum of
cloaking distances, and the cost is the level-of-anonymity which is proportional to the
size of anonymity-set that provides the location-anonymity. In essence, r is the radius of
the equivalent cloaking area, and it gives a figure about how much location-anonymity is
provided if a new node is added to the anonymity-set. By looking into the data traces of r,

















































































































Figure 6.9: The radius of equivalent cloaking area metric r with varying level-of-anonymity
k .
110
6.2.2 Network Diameter d Impact
Average and Worst-Case Communication-Cost
The results of average and worst-case communication-cost obtained by varying d for each
value of k are analyzed in this section. As shown in Fig. 6.10 and 6.11, when d exceeds
some point d0 = k, the communication-cost in the average and worst-case becomes bounded
from above and below by O(d2) and Ω(d2) respectively. This is fully coherent with the
result of Theorems 6 and 8. Note that the symmetry of the Big Θ notation entails that
d0 ∈ Θ(k) is convertible to k0 ∈ Θ(d) such that the asymptotic constant c0 of the later
equals to the reciprocal of the former.
What is significant is that the constant of the asymptotic relation d0 ∈ Θ(k) is seen
to be 1. This is exactly the reciprocal of c0 as recorded for the variable k part of the
results, see section 6.2.1. Thus, c0, which determines the inflection point of the asymptotic
relationships, is the same for both parts of the results, namely: variable k, and variable
d. This is again fully coherent with the results established in Theorems 6, 7, 8, and 9.
Consequently, k0 = c0d = d is a system-wide inflection point at which the asymptotic
growth of the communication-cost changes from d2, when k  d, into k2 dominance, when
k  d. The estimated values of other asymptotic constants when d exceeds the inflection
point are listed in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2: Values of Asymptotic Constants when k  d
Asymptotic constant Average-case analysis Worst-case analysis





For the average case, it is observed that ES consumed more energy as d becomes larger
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compared to k, as shown in Fig. 6.10. Since FSS puts all the remainder of n/k in the
first anonymity-set, it is an energy saver with respect to d2 component of the cost, and
a consumer in terms of k2 component of the cost. The opposite holds for ES. When d
surpasses k, the term d2 becomes more dominant than k2 component, and vice versa.
Consequently, It is more practical to adopt FSS when d exceeds k, as in Fig. 6.10, and
Fig. 6.11. However, when k is relatively large compared to d, ES should be preferred, as
in Fig. 6.2, and Fig. 6.3.
For the worst-case results, as shown in Fig. 6.11, FSS was outperformed by ES specially
at large values of k due to the fact that the worst-case cost of FSS occurs in the first














































































































Figure 6.11: The worst-case communication-cost with varying d .
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Benefit-Cost Analysis
We have also found that ROI decreased with d for both the average and worst-case cost,
as shown in Fig. 6.12, and 6.13, mostly due to the fact of ROI = k/c, where c encompasses
both the k2 and d2 components. Since k is constant in this set of experiments, the sizes of
anonymity-sets and the k2 component of the cost varied slightly due to the mild change in
the remainder of n/k. Therefore, approximately the ROI changed inversely with d2 when
d oversteps k. This became more obvious when d grows beyond the inflection point d0 = k
as d2 dominates k2.
In analogy with the average and worst-case cost results, the comparison among ROI
of different anonymity-sets construction methods of the anonymity scheme reveals similar
implications. For the average-case results shown in Fig. 6.12, ES yields the lowest ROI
because of its sensitivity to the increment in the d2 component of the cost. For the worst-
case ROI shown in Fig. 6.13, FSS achieves the lowest since the whole remainder was left



















































































We now compare the path length of the query and response measured in number of hops
in the average and worst-case when d is variable for different anonymity-sets construction
methods, and several values of k. First of all, we observed that empirical results respected
our theoretical analysis in Theorem 10. Specifically, we found that the path length is in
O(d) for k ≤ d. We further estimated the value of the asymptotic constants to be 2.1
for the average-case, and 2.9 for the worst-case path length. That is, the path length in
the average and worst-case is less that 2.1d, and 2.9d for k < d. We depict our results in
Fig. 6.14, and Fig. 6.15 for various values of k, and different anonymity-sets construction
methods.
It is found that in the average-case, the generated paths by ES are mostly longer
than that by the others, due to the fact that ES distributes the reminder nodes evenly
over all the anonymity-sets, thereby subject to the longest path. In the worst-case, on the
other hand, the three anonymity-sets construction methods mostly produced identical path
lengths as d increased, mostly due to the fixed and relatively small values of k that well
mitigates the influence of collection-hops and lets the effect of routing-hops that grows
with d rather trivial. Hence, the worst-case path length occurred at an anonymity-set
that is far away from the first set where the routing-hops are more. However, the size
of such anonymity-set, and eventually the number of collection-hops, is almost the same
for different anonymity-sets construction methods. This is because the remainder out of
n/k is small, so the anonymity-sets construction methods either change the size of the
anonymity-sets other than the first set mildly or leave it untouched. Consequently, the






































































































Figure 6.15: The worst-case number of hops with varying d .
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Location Anonymity
Recall that our empirical evaluation in section 6.2.1 confirms the first part of the assertion
we make in Theorem 11. To test the second part of the mentioned assertion, we computed
the location-anonymity metrics namely, dmax and r using Algorithm 4 for large range of d
values. We observed that both of the metrics were less than k for relatively large values of d
compared to k. This observation respected the upper bound we established in Theorem 11,
which is O(k), for k ∈ [1,Θ(d)]. As argued in the proof of the same theorem, the location-
anonymity offered by secure k-anonymous query scheme is limited by the anonymity-set
size which is in turn asymptotically bounded from above by the level-of-anonymity k. Our
results are depicted in Fig. 6.16, and Fig. 6.17.
By comparing location-anonymity metrics under different anonymity-sets construction
methods, we noted similar observations to that of varying level-of anonymity k (see section
6.2.1). That is, ES achieved better location-anonymity compared to FSS whenever there is
a remainder out of n/k for the reason mentioned section 6.2.1. We also found that as d is
large they all performed similarly. This is due to the fact that as d and n are increased, the
number of anonymity-sets bn/kc exceeds the remainder out of n/k since we kept k fixed
during this set of experiment. This possibly causes ES unable to distribute the remainder
equally on all the anonymity-sets, and possibly some of the anonymity-sets would be left
untouched at size of |s| = k which is also the smallest size of anonymity-sets for FSS. Recall
that we select the anonymity-set with the minimum size to compute dmax and r. Thus,
FSS and ES behaves similarly. However, they may differ a little due to the variations in the





















































































































Conclusion and Future Work
7.1 Conclusion
In this work, we studied the average and worst-case analysis of the trade-off between
query-anonymity and communication-cost in the context of sensor-cloud based IoT systems.
Towards that, we proposed a novel theoretical framework for secure k-anonymous query
schemes on the basis of well-known security models namely, ciphertext indistinguishability
under chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA), and information theoretic notion of perfect
secrecy. Along the way, we introduced a new notion of secure query k-anonymity that
relates itself to the standard concept of anonymity-set in a natural way. This framework is
proved to be useful in the design of secure k-anonymous query scheme, analysis of trade-
off between query-anonymity and communication-cost, and evaluation of provably secure
query-anonymity protocols that are immune to intersection attack, and other types of
traffic analysis attacks. We show that constructing equi-probable anonymity sets is not
only sufficient for achieving a certain level-of-anonymity, but also the cheapest manner in
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which to achieve it.
To prove its validity, we presented DAS scheme as a real-world realization of our theo-
retical framework that achieves secure query k-anonymity in the presence of an eavesdrop-
ping adversary who intercepts the anonymity scheme for sufficiently long time. In DAS,
we adopt a unique proactive approach that avoids intersection attack by using disjoint
anonymity-sets with distinct members. We break DAS down into its essential elements
namely, the partition algorithm π, the anonymity transformation T , and the inverse trans-
formation T−1. This proves to be useful in our modular design of DAS for the sensor-cloud-
based IoT environment, especially in the implementation of its partition algorithm, query
routing algorithm, and querying protocol. The main design goal is to lower the incurred
communication-cost while satisfying the desired level-of-anonymity k.
Despite its simplicity, DAS is remarkably useful in the analysis of trade-off between
offered query k-anonymity and incurred communication-cost. By offering secure query k-
anonymity, DAS precludes all types of intersection attacks, and thus assures a certain level-
of-anonymity regardless of the computational power of the adversary. DAS also facilitates
the query-anonymity measurement model since its offered level-of-anonymity k is equal to
the size of the anonymity-set, i.e. k = |s|.
Our theoretical assertions establishes that the network diameter d plays the role of the
system-wide inflection point k ∈ Θ(d) at which the asymptotic growth of the average and
worst-case communication-cost changes from d2 into k2 dominance. That is, the asymptotic
bounds on the average and worst-case communication-cost is quadratically increased as
the offered level-of-anonymity exceeds the network diameter, and they are quadratic in the
network diameter for the opposite range.
Based on the proposed querying and routing protocols, extensive analysis was con-
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ducted in order to establish bounds on trade-offs between offered query-anonymity and
various performance measures such as communication-cost, return-on-investment ROI,
path length, and offered location-anonymity. Such comprehensive evaluation helps to un-
ravel key factors affecting the performance of the anonymity scheme. Our experimental
results show that the return-on-investment ROI is at its highest values at the point k = d,
and most of the deduced bounds are functions of the level-of-anonymity k and network
diameter d. For instance, both of the location-anonymity metrics dmax and r are in O(d)
for larger values of k with respect to d, and in O(k) for the opposite range. On the other
hand, the query and response path length measured in number of hops is in O(k) in the
average-case and worst-case when k surpasses d, and it is in O(d) for the opposite range.
Furthermore, the performance of the different anonymity-sets construction methods was
observed and analyzed, which shows that in the average-case scenario, First-Set-Spread
outperforms when k is relatively small compared to d, while Equal-Spread is favored when
k is relatively large compared to d. In the worst-case scenario, First-Set-Spread fails behind
Equal-Spread and this is more visible at large values of k.
7.2 Future Work
We endeavor to make our evaluation results more comprehensive by testing our ideas
in various simulation settings of routing algorithms, data collection strategies, network
topologies and other system parameters. In this thesis, we have considered source routing
and piggyback data collection in a square grid topology. It will be interesting to explore the
behavior of the secure k-anonymous scheme under a variety of routing algorithms such as
dynamic routing, data collections that do not use piggyback strategy, and different network
environments.
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Another streak of research is to design different partition algorithms that make use
of the security properties of secure k-anonymous query scheme. In this work so far, we
considered disjoint anonymity-sets whose members are adjacent to implement our partition
algorithm π. Investigation of other approaches that adopt nonadjacent disjoint anonymity-
sets, and comparison with our approach is a fruitful area of research to explore. Such
approaches are deemed to be efficient in terms of the achieved location-anonymity since the
nodes in each anonymity-set are remote from each other. Also, it will be then required to
develop suitable static or adaptive techniques to spread the members of each anonymity-
set all over the network in order to achieve a certain level of location-anonymity. Our
location-anonymity metrics namely, radius of equivalent cloaking area r, and maximum
cloaking distance dmax can be utilized as crucial tools in the analysis and measurement of
offered location-anonymity.
When the nonadjacent disjoint anonymity-sets of DAS are put into effect, it will then
be interesting to seek rigorous answers to the following research questions using formal
methods:
• To achieve a secure query k-anonymity of level k, what is the sufficient communication-
cost on average and in the worst-case?
• To achieve a secure query k-anonymity of level k, what is the necessary communication-
cost on average and in the worst-case?
• What is the impact of spreading members of disjoint anonymity-sets throughout the
network on the performance of secure query k-anonymity scheme?
In the formulation of the cost-anonymity trade-off problem, we primarily focused on
global passive eavesdropping adversary, specifically honest-but-curious model. As another
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direction of future work, we may consider other models of attacker such as active adversary.
Such adversary may be able to manipulate the query and response messages, or have partial
of full control on the physical and virtual environment of sensor-cloud-based IoT System.
It will be interesting to ask how we can develop the right strategies to detect malicious
traffic or nodes, prevent such active attacks, and recover from their consequences.
In this work, we have avoided intersection and statistical disclosure attack by using dis-
joint anonymity-sets to allow accurate and precise measurement of the level-of-anonymity
since it is equal to the lowest size of anonymity-sets. However, it will be interesting to study
the anonymity-performance trade-off under vulnerable environment in which anonymity-
sets are allowed to intersect with each other. Then, it will be challenging to design an
adaptive partition algorithm to keep the level-of-anonymity within a predefined tolerance
as a design parameter.
It can be argued that communication-based anonymity schemes are not the only ones
that can implement trust-none model in practice. specifically, homomorphic encryption
technique, which allows computations to be carried out directly on the ciphertext, is
another mechanism that does not necessitate trusting other components in the system.
Consequently, it is also of interest to examine the trade-off problem using this powerful
technique.
Another avenue for further research is to develop a fault tolerance mechanism to allow
graceful degradation of system performance in case of failure. This requires to design
error detection techniques to detect faults, and change or update the routes to queried
anonymity-set, and partition algorithm to maintain the same desired level-of-anonymity.
Similar adaptive partition and routing algorithms may be feasible to accommodate dynamic
network environment in which nodes are allowed to join and leave during the lifetime of
the k-anonymous query scheme. The main design goal of these adaptive algorithms is to
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repartition the network into disjoint anonymity-sets of size in [k, 2k − 1].
We also see applications of our theoretical framework, design and implementation of
secure query k-anonymity schemes, and our trade-off analysis as a promising future work.
For example, we seek to study the performance-anonymity trade-offs problem in various
environments such as for big data, and cloud computing. It will then be required to revisit
our theoretical framework and our analysis of trade-offs to establish a suite of average and
worst-case bounds on them.
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